本研究清楚指出廠商次序的空間競爭會造成無效率的位置選擇及無謂損失，在次序空間競爭下，接近市場兩端所產生的獨占區域(邊緣市場)為先驅者決定位址的重要因素，且此因素會扭曲社會資源的配置。先驅者選擇靠近邊緣的市場是「獨佔區域」與「市場份額」之間做取捨的結果。在可進行差別取價的架構下，先驅者在邊緣市場會盡可能的擴張其範圍，以便在它的市場範圍內對消費者索取高價(高訂價的能力)。
本研究更進一步研究在空間競爭結構下，多考慮了廠商設立多工廠參與競爭的影響。研究發現，如果一家廠商設立多工廠，參與同時進入市場的空間競爭，並不會扭曲社會資源的配置。然而，如果一家多工廠的廠商「優先」進入市場，廠商讓其工廠座落相鄰所創造出巨額的聯合利潤，將使得次序競爭造成無效率的位置選擇及無謂損失更加嚴重。
此外，當市場的距離看成甜度的測度時，有鑑於潛在進入者的存在，擁有多工廠之先驅者會生產甜度較近的產品來保有「聯合利潤」。即表示，潛在進入者將會生產甜度較極端的產品來吸引在邊緣市場的客戶。

This thesis clearly points out how spatial competition with sequential entry leads the inefficient location configuration and causes deadweight loss. In spatial competition with sequential entry, “monopoly region” yielded from nearby the endpoint of the market (peripheral market) can be a crucial decision factor for pioneer such that the allocation of social resources is distorted. Pioneer’s location choice nearby peripheral market is driven by a trade-off between the “monopoly region” and the “market share”. With discriminatory pricing, pioneer’s turf nearby the peripheral market will be amplified as large as possible such that pioneer can charge relative high price (high pricing ability) to consumers at its market.
Moreover, we extend that a competitor sets multiple stores into spatial duopoly. We find that if a firm set multiple stores to engage spatial competition with simultaneous entry, the allocation of social resources is never distorted. However, if a firm with multiple stores owns the “priority” on entering the market, the considerable “joint profit” yielded from the adjacent multiple stores will cement the result that spatial entered competition leads the deadweight loss on social welfare.
Furthermore, when the measure of sweetness now replaces distance, with the foresight of potential entrants, multi-store pioneer produces more similar character product to keep on the “joint profit” yielded from the adjacent multiple stores. Meanwhile, the potential entrant will produce the extreme product to hold on peripheral consumers.

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