| 研究生: |
梁慶全 Liang, Ching-Chuan |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
台灣南部地區票券金融公司於初級市場業務
競合關係之研究 A Study on the Co-opetition Relationship in Primary Market of Bills Finance Corporations in Southern Taiwan |
| 指導教授: |
莊雙喜
Chung, Shuang-Shi |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 企業管理學系碩士在職專班 Department of Business Administration (on the job class) |
| 論文出版年: | 2006 |
| 畢業學年度: | 94 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 95 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 票券金融公司 、競合理論 、賽局理論 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Bills finance corporation, Co-opetition theory, Game theory |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:137 下載:3 |
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票券金融公司為國內貨幣市場資金的仲介者,透過票券金融公司各類信用工具交易,短期資金的供給與需求才能運作順遂。貨幣市場可分為初級發行市場及次級交易市場,初級市場中又以發行商業本票為主要業務,佔有各類短期發行工具的89%,雖然該市場最終係以商業本票等各類信用工具之發行來呈現,然由此衍生出徵信、授信、報價及催收等業務運作,才是初級市場業務之核心,各票券金融公司負責初級市場業務人員,也以上述四項業務為競爭及合作之標的。
本研究,針對南部地區十九家票券金融公司從事初級市場業務之人員,以問卷調查方式來獲取相關資料,經文獻探討建立起初級市場競爭、合作及公司利益主架構,另再加入未來利率變動及未來景氣變動等構面為干擾變項,運用統計方法及報價賽局推論方式,解析南部地區票券金融公司於初級市場業務競爭合作之互動情形。
研究發現,南部地區票券金融公司於初級市場業務之競爭與合作同時存在,且合作程度大於競爭程度,其中催收是最競爭且最不合作的業務。另發現短期內未來利率及景氣的變動,不會影響初級市場內競爭及合作對達成公司利益的效果。而老票券公司與新票券公司於初級市場業務之競爭、合作構面上有所差異,大抵上而言,新票券公司採取合作策略大於老票券公司。而合作、競爭與公司利益各為正、負相關,代表合作有利公司利益達成,競爭則有損公司利益;且競爭對公司利益傷害大於合作對公司利益的幫助。另於報價賽局的互動中,南部地區票券金融公司傾向合作策略,符合2005年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主Aumann的重複賽局之推論。最後,本研究將南部地區票券金融公司分為高度競爭公司與高度合作公司兩群,以利實務界於競爭合作互動中之參考。
Bills finance corporation is acting financial intermediation in domestic money market, transacting by means of various credit tools, demand and supply of short-term capital therefore works smoothly. Money markets can be divided into primary market and secondary market. Issuing commercial psaper is the main business in the primary market, reaches nearly 89% of short run tools. The core business of primary market consists of commercial operations, like credit information investigation, lending, quoting price and receiving after problem loans, despites primary market by means of issuing commercial paper at last. All the persons of bills financial corporations who in charge of primary market all view aforementioned four businesses as objects of competition and cooperation.
This study, is engaged in persons of 19 bills financial corporations in southern taiwan who in charge of primary mrket. Gains the data by the questionnaire survey way. Then establishes the construction of competition, cooperation and company benefit in the primary mrket after the literature discussion. At last, join disclosure of future interest rate and fluctuation of future economic growth for the bisturbance factor. Use statistical method and offering games to explain the interaction situaion of co-opetition in the primary mrket.
According to research findings, competition and cooperation both exist in the primary markets, between bills financial corporations in southern Taiwan. Furthermore, finding also indicated the level of cooperation exceeds the level of competition. Among the four main business functions, the most competitive and least cooperative is receiving after problem loans. Whether by means of competition or cooperation to achieve better profit, research findings disclosure of future interest rate and fluctuation of future economic growth do not have influences upon competition and cooperation. In addition, there are differences arose from competition and cooperation between senior and junior bills financial corporations. In general, new formed bills financial companies tend to adapt cooperative strategies rather than aged ones. Cooperation has positive relation but competition is negative to company’s profit. The former says cooperation is good for reaching better profit, but competition harms. Furthermore, competition harms more despite of the benefits from cooperation. Meantime, in the interaction of offering games, bills financial corporations prefer cooperative strategy, the finding in conformity with the inference of repeat game theory, (Aumann, 2005),the winner of Nobel Economic Prize. At last, in this study we divided the 19 bills financial companies into two groups include highly competitive and highly cooperative respectively. This way is informative to the current practices, and helpful for each party in better understanding of the interaction of competition and cooperation.
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