本研究旨在探討擔保契約條件以及銀行往來關係對擔保機率的影響，首先，研究在台灣信用市場中，借貸雙方資訊不對稱的情況下，借款企業以擔保作為信號發射是否能提高放款銀行對企業的評價；第二，重新定義3種銀行往來關係，並觀察對擔保機率的影響；最後，在次貸危機爆發後，探討首位融資銀行是否具有提供流動性保險的功能。
主要結果顯示企業風險指標對於擔保機率成正向關係，並不支持信號發射假說；另外，我們也發現企業與銀行往來關係越密切，其擔保機率會越高，探討其可能原因為：1.往來關係強度越強，則借貸雙方承做大額放款機會增加，因此增加企業違約機率，故放款銀行會要求借款企業提高擔保機率；2.當企業與銀行往來關係密切時，銀行會更容易判斷企業真實風險，因此，在面對真實風險較高的企業，會在承做放款契約時，增加其擔保機率。除此之外，本研究進一步討論放款額度與擔保機率內生性的問題，實證結果顯示，考慮放款額度與擔保會同時發生的情形，3種銀行往來關係並不是決定擔保的主要因素。
最後，探討台灣地區首位融資銀行是否提供流動性保險功能，結果指出相對於非首位融資銀行，首位融資銀行面對借款企業因總體環境惡化造成財務危機時，會顯著降低擔保以幫助企業度過難關，但此流動性保險效果可能受到政府介入、公營行庫及集團銀行等因素的影響。

Our study is to focus on the impact of bank-firm’s relationships on the collateral-based lending for Taiwanese firms. First of all, under the environment in Taiwan credit market with the information asymmetric between banks and firms, we examine if the Signaling Mechanism exists or not? In short, we want to know if the borrowing-firms can arise its value by providing collateral. Moreover, we redefine 3 bank-firms relationships and discuss the influences between the probability of providing collateral and the bank-firm’s relationships. Finally, after Subprime Mortgage Crisis, we are interest in that if house-bank will ask for less collateral to help enterprises get enough funds so that the Liquidity Insurance Hypothesis is being supported.
First, the main finding is that borrowing-firms’ credit risk is positive to the probability of providing collateral. This rejects the Signaling Mechanism Hypothesis. Furthermore, we find that closer relationships between firms and banks will increase the incidence of collateralization. Then, we propose the possible reasons as following. Firstly, a strengthener relationship between enterprises and banks increases the opportunity of signing large loan amount contracts. When large loan amount contracts are signed, the firm’s credit risk will increase such that the banks will ask enterprises to get higher probability of providing collateral to ensure the loan safety. Secondly, banks will know the enterprise’s truly potential credit risk while the bank-firm’s relationship is getting closer. That is, when banks face those firms with higher potential credit risks, in order to ensure loan safety, firms are always asked to provide more collateral to get financing funds. Besides, we consider the simultaneous problem between collateralization and loan amount, and we find that 3 bank-firm’s relationships are uncorrelated with collateral probability.
Last, we judge the problem of liquidity insurance function of house-bank. We find that when macroeconomics becomes worse, the house-bank decreases the probability of collateralization to help enterprise get enough operating funds. But these findings may result from the activities of government; group-banks and publicly banks.

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