本研究鑒於所回顧的組合契約相關文獻，以往的組合契約主要為兩種模式，(1)單一賣方對單一買方，(2)多賣方對單一買方，進行供應鏈的合作關係，但只探討單方利潤最大化或成本最小化，無探討雙方在整體利益考量下，求解出最適雙方的契約內容。故本研究之假設為單一製造商與單一零售商，考量零售商需求不確定及整體利益下，雙方經過多次協商並協議出最適的組合契約。利用兩階段隨機規劃法建構零售商期望利潤最大化之數學模式，並透過L型演算法進行求解。在數值分析上，藉由兩種不同的情境假設，證明組合契約的功效及利用L型演算法求解零售商之最適產能分配。最後為分析製造商與零售商間之賽局模式關係，運用敏感度分析、L型演算法、雙方之整體利益考量以及雙方完全合作等概念等，求解出最適雙方之組合契約條款。

Portfolio contracts have two modes to proceed the cooperative relationship in supply chain at the past literatures: (1) single seller to single buyer, (2) multiple sellers to single buyer. Most of these literatures only focus on profit maximization or cost minimization for only one of the supply chain members’ while little of literatures investigate the negotiation procedures within the supply chain. Despite of the total profit of the supply chain, this study investigates the optimal contract considering uncertainty of retailer demand and overall benefits in the single manufacturer and single retailer scenario. In this study, the mathematical model which maximizes the retailer’s expected profit is presented by the two-stage stochastic programming method and solved by the L-shaped algorithm. In the numerical analysis, we consider two scenarios to demonstrate the efficacy of the portfolio contract and use L-shaped algorithm to solve the retailer the optimal capacity allocation problem. To analyze the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer in game theoretic model, we use sensitivity analysis and L-shaped algorithm while considering the overall benefits and the impact of cooperation. As a result, we can further find optimal portfolio contract contents for both parties base on this analysis.

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