在美中科技競爭加劇與全球供應鏈重組的背景下，半導體產業已從單純的商業考量，轉變為地緣政治與國家安全核心戰略的一環。本研究以台積電(TSMC)為分析對象，透過路徑依賴與空間修補兩大理論視角，探討其於美國、日本與德國的設廠行動，如何反映出企業在制度壓力與政治變局下的全球佈局邏輯。
　　研究採用質性研究法，結合文獻分析、個案比較與PEST與SWOT交叉應用，評估台積電在不同地區的設廠條件、策略選擇與風險應對。研究發現，台積電的全球擴張並非經濟理性，而是回應美中科技戰、美國盟友政策誘因，以及對於技術外溢與供應鏈安全的戰略性調整。同時，雖然台積電在海外擴廠動作頻繁，但其核心技術、研發重心與主要產能仍然根留台灣，顯示企業在全球化與國家利益間，雖然受到政治力由上而下的壓力，卻能在由下而上的韌性中，掌握一定程度的能動性。
　國家力量與制度環境的牽引，在政經環境變動下，台積電的行動展現了在地緣風險下的全球戰略敏銳度，將進一步探討政治風險與制度誘因形塑全球半導體產業新一輪的空間政治格局。

This study finds that TSMC’s global expansion is shaped less by pure market logic and more by its strategic navigation of geopolitical pressures, institutional frameworks, and corporate capabilities. While diversifying production across the United States, Japan, and Germany, TSMC retains its core technologies, R&D, and major production in Taiwan, reflecting strong path dependence. Using path dependence and spatial fix as theoretical lenses, and applying qualitative methods—including literature review, comparative case analysis, and PEST–SWOT integration—the research shows that overseas investments are driven by the U.S.–China technology rivalry, allied policy incentives, and concerns over supply chain security and technology leakage.
　　In addition, by aligning theory with reality, this study examines the differences in rent-seeking between governments and enterprises, aiming to identify a win–win balance in government–business interactions as a response to the restructuring of the semiconductor industry’s globalized deployment. Spatial fix explains how governments seek to redistribute semiconductor production to manage geopolitical risks, though such efforts face constraints from entrenched technological ecosystems and resource concentrations. TSMC’s case exemplifies the need for global high-tech firms to balance efficiency, security, and adaptability, maintaining flexibility without compromising technological leadership amid a redefined geopolitical order in the semiconductor industry.

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(三) 碩博士論文
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(五) 專題研討會
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