本論文旨在探討康友案發生後，台灣上市櫃公司高階主管異動與盈餘管理的關係，康友案為近年台灣嚴重會計舞弊案件之一，受到廣大群體的關注。康友案後主管機關祭出相應的舉措，當盈餘管理的程度越強烈，加強監管力道的背景下，導致從事積極性的盈餘管理成本提高，預見高階主管替換的可能性會增加。因此本研究檢視2017年至2020年期間上市櫃公司，應計項目盈餘管理對董事長與總經理替換的影響。第一部分實證結果發現若董事長或總經理盈餘管理的程度越強烈，會提升其替換的可能性，其中董事長替換的群體影響較深。另外也發現盈餘管理程度越高，高階主管身分為董事長兼任總經理者的異動機率也會提高，說明了公司運營與策略規劃執行和監督集中於同一人，兼任者權力過大，越有動機從事盈餘管理。而在本研究第二部分加入審計委員會與會計師特性後，探討盈餘管理與高階主管替換間的關係，發現盈餘管理的程度越高與董事長替換亦呈正相關。

This thesis aims to explore the relationship between executive turnover and earnings management in Taiwanese listed companies following the Kangyo case. After the Kangyo case, regulatory authorities implemented corresponding measures. As the intensity of earnings management increases under the strengthened regulatory framework, the costs associated with aggressive earnings management rise, making it more likely for top executives to be replaced. Therefore, this thesis examines the impact of accrual-based earnings management on the turnover of chairpersons and presidents in listed companies during the period from 2017 to 2020.
The empirical results in the first part of the study indicate that the more intense the earnings management by the chairperson or president, the higher the likelihood of their replacement, with the effect being more pronounced in the case of chairperson turnover. Additionally, it was found that the higher the degree of earnings management, the more likely it is for an executive holding both the chairperson and president roles to be replaced. In the second part of this study, the relationship between earnings management and executive turnover is examined after considering the characteristics of the audit committee and auditor. The findings reveal that higher levels of earnings management are positively correlated with the replacement of the chairperson.

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