本研究嘗試探討集團董事連結之網絡關係對集團績效之影響為主要研究架構，並加入核心公司資源、核心公司家族持及核心公司CEO雙重性作為干擾變數，以分析干擾變數對董事會連結與集團績效具何種影響進行探討。
本研究以中華徵信社於2005年針對台灣2003年集團企業所進行之調查結果，作為本研究之選樣對象，取前150企業集團作為本研究之樣本，但由於金融企業集團的特質與其他產業之特質與結構不同，故排除金融集團25個樣本，及資料不完整之集團企業，納入本研究之有效樣本為96份。
本研究結果顯示，董事會連結次數愈多，將有利於集團績效，而垂直連結與水平連結愈多均有助於集團績效的提升。在干擾變數方面，研究發現，核心公司的家族持股愈多，將不利於董事會連結與集團績效的提升，而核心公司CEO若具雙重性，則有利於董事會連結與集團績效之提升。且由於垂直連結具有直接控制的功能，所以核心公司可支配現金愈豐富，也有利於董事會連結與集團績效。
由本研究的分析結果，提供給企業在尋求合併對象時，對核心公司的股權結構及資源，可以作為評估案的考量因素，當核心公司為家族企業時，在進行合併考量時有可能會選擇有利於自身的利益條件，來尋求合併的對象，而非以集團的立場來考量，這將會削減集團的績效，相對的，對於被合併公司股東的權益也可能受損，而在核心公司資源方面，當公司有較多可支配現金，對於合併公司將可以提供較多的支援，這方面則將有利於被併公司股東的權益。

This study intends to investigate how board network relationship of business group impacts on group performance, and the resources, family ownership and CEO duality of parent company moderate such relationship. After reviewing the secondary data of top 150 group businesses from China Credit Information Service LTD. (2005), 96 effective samples are included in this study.
The results show that interlock frequency, vertical and horizontal interlock positively associated with group performance. Family ownership of parent company has a positively moderating effect on the relationship between interlock frequency and group performance, whereas CEO duality of parent company has a negatively moderating effect on the relationship between interlock frequency and group performance. Vertical interlock of business groups with the abilities controlling over their subsidiaries, therefore, free-cash flow of parent company has a positively moderating effect on the relationship between vertical interlock and group performance.

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