Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)與Busse (2001)均探討美國之共同基金市場是否有依據年中績效排名而改變其投資組合風險的行為存在。但結論卻南轅北轍，其不同處則在於Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)使用月報酬，而Busse (2001)使用日報酬。本文以台灣經濟新報資料庫中的平衡型基金、債券型基金，以及開放式股票型基金為樣本，卡方檢定為架構去分別以月報酬及日報酬資料探討民國85年至民國92年期間，台灣的共同基金經理人在年中績效評估過後，是否有明顯的風險調整行為。

　　實證結果發現，並沒有如Busse (2001)所言的，以月報酬驗證時存在著競爭情形，但以日報酬驗證時則消失殆盡。以開放型股票基金為例，以日報酬驗證的結果反而比月報酬驗證的結果更加地顯著。而不論是以日報酬或是月報酬驗證的結果，彼此間並不會完全一致。以債券型基金的第一個子期間為例（民國85年至民國88年），以月報酬驗證的結果為調整風險行為不甚明顯，但是以日報酬驗證的話，則是在此期間有相當顯著的風險調整行為。

　　在本文中，除了開放型股票基金的結果能與我們的假設完全一致之外，其餘兩種基金都只有部分評估期間與假設一致，甚至是與假設相反。其中以債券型基金的差距最大，可能是投資標的風險極小的原因，導致分析結果並不如預期。而平衡型基金雖然可看出競賽的情勢出現，但是仍不明顯，可能是平衡型基金在台灣仍屬少數族群，儘管成長速度驚人，但是受限於觀察值過少的原因，無法確實觀察出平衡型基金族群中的競賽情形。

　　Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Busse (2001) both investigated whether there exists altering portfolio risk behavior according to the midterm performance ranking. But their conclusion is different to each other. In this paper we use balanced funds, bond funds, and open-end stock funds in TEJ as samples and chi-square test as structure to investigate if mutual fund managers have obvious risk adjustment behavior after midterm performance assessment.

　　Our results show that there does not exist a tournament as Busse (2001) showed when the monthly return is used, but the competition disappears when daily return data is used. For example, the result we identify with daily return in opened stock funds is more obvious than that with monthly return. Whether we use daily return or monthly return, the results are not the same. For example, the first sub period in bond funds we identify is that risk adjustment behavior is not so obvious, but when use daily return, there are quite obvious risk adjustment behavior in the assessment period.

　　In this paper, besides the result of open-end stock funds can totally consistent with our assumption, there are parts of the result in other two kinds of funds can consistent with our assumption, even contrary to our hypothesis. Among those results, the difference in the bond funds is the biggest one, perhaps the risk of the investment target is too little, and result in the analysis is not as we expect. Although we can see the competition in the balanced funds, the tournament is not obvious yet, maybe the number of balanced funds in Taiwan is too small, despite the speed of growth is amazing, limit to the observations is too few, we can not indeed observe the tournament in the balanced funds group.

中文部分
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