面對變化快速的消費市場，「價格」是維持零售商競爭力之利器。但不斷下降價格對供應鏈而言並不是長久之策，零售商與供應商應將注意力轉移到消費者身上，透過適當之促銷活動使得消費者能對產品產生認同並建立企業知名度。大型零售商具有大型或連鎖通路，對於供應商而言是不可或缺的行銷通路，無論是供應商主動要求強勢零售商合作促銷，抑或是配合強勢零售商進行促銷活動，如何在收益及成本間取得平衡，找到能使自身利潤最大的策略，將是通路中各成員所必須權衡的問題。
本研究利用價格競爭需求函數描述強勢零售商主導之競爭市場，藉由文獻中所提及之促銷策略與協商手法設定不同促銷策略之模型情境，並透過數學規劃建立加入促銷效果下強勢零售商主導之供應鏈決策模型，進行促銷成本、零售價格、批發價格與訂購量之決策變數求解。之後，探討不同成本分配策略下，供應鏈成員對於促銷成本分配之情形。
在模型驗證中，本研究以家用紙市場做為驗證對象，並針對求解結果進行模型分析，由數學證明推導出4個結果，在利潤模型中得到：強勢零售商訂購策略、供應商之批發價格調整策略以及供應商回饋比例上限3個結論；而在效用模型中則探討強勢零售商在不同訂購策略下，供應商之促銷成本費用分擔上限之情形。由上述4個結果解釋供應鏈之決策行為，並提供強勢零售商最佳成本分配策略。

Facing the rapid change market, price is a tool to maintain competitiveness of retailer. However, lowering prices is not exactly a long-term strategy. Retailers and suppliers should be passed on to consumers’ attention. Applying appropriate promotion activities could have consumers make agreement with products and is helpful to establish reputation of company. Dominant retailer with large or chain stores is essential marketing channels for suppliers. No matter supplier invites dominant retailer or cooperation with retailer for promotion activities. How to balance between profits and costs will be a problem for supply chain members to consider.
In this study, we use a price competition demand function to describe retailer leading market. And we combine promotion strategy and negotiation scheme to formulate decision-making model under different situation. Through mathematical programming, we solve decision variables like promotional costs, retail prices, wholesale price and order quantity. After all, we discuss what changes between supply chain members for the distribution of promotion costs under different cost allocation strategies.
A household paper market is used as a validation object for this study. With the results of the models, we prove four lemmas. In profit model we have ordering policy for dominant retailer, wholesale prices adjustment strategy of supplier and promotion costs feedback ratio of supplier. While in utility model is promotional cost-sharing ceiling of supplier under different ordering strategies. From above results, we explain supply chain decision-making behavior and provide the best cost allocation strategy for dominant retailer.

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