雲端技術的成熟不僅驅動產業創新，更創造新興的平台經濟，使消費者購買產品時，除了考量產品本身，還會綜合考量產品背後所屬平台能夠提供的其他加乘價值。原先在市場中佔有一席之地的既有廠商為了克服傳統商業模式被邊緣化的困境，會選擇投入資源創建平台，或者與擁有平台優勢的新進廠商採取兼容合作，共同創造更大的市場規模。根據上述所觀察的市場現況，本研究設計一個數學模型，探討雙佔競爭市場中，存在一個具軟體優勢的既有廠商，在面對可能具平台優勢的一新進廠商進入市場時，兩者於不同服務之垂直競爭差異會如何影響各自的軟體服務定價及產品兼容性策略。本研究依照兩廠商於平台面的競爭情況可將模型分為三種情境：（a）雙方於平台面無明顯差異（b）既有廠商利用強大資源創造平台面的優勢（c）新進廠商於平台面存在顯著優勢，且兩廠商可能採取四種兼容策略：（i）雙方產品不相容（ii）產品雙向相容（iii）產品單向相容—既有廠商之軟體兼容至新進廠商之平台（iv）產品單向相容—新進廠商之軟體兼容至既有廠商之平台。而兩廠商將評估自身的最佳獲利，決定是否要與競爭者採取產品兼容合作，當兩者選擇同樣的兼容策略時，則該策略即為兩廠商之均衡策略。
本研究透過量化的數學模型探討兩廠商之間的互動，發現（1）當兩廠商於平台面無明顯差異時，當消費者忠誠度高、兩平台費用價差大，兩廠商會採取雙向兼容策略，反之則新進廠商將退出市場（2）當既有廠商於平台及軟體皆有優勢時，當消費者忠誠度低、兩平台費用價差大，兩廠商會採取雙向兼容策略，反之，則是新進廠商會將軟體兼容至既有廠商平台（3）當既有廠商具軟體面優勢、新進廠商具平台面優勢時，會在同樣條件下採取雙向兼容策略，但當消費者忠誠度高、兩平台費用價差小時，卻將由新進廠商將軟體兼容至既有廠商平台，兩者專注於各自的優勢服務項目。證明在不同市場競爭情況下，廠商將選擇不同的均衡策略以獲得最大效益。

This research designed an analytical model of a duopoly market. There was an original firm (firm 1) provided software service and it had software advantages. When it faced with a new entrant (firm 2), how will the vertical competition between two-dimensional services affect their service pricing and compatible strategies? The model could be divided into three scenarios according to the competition between two players on the platform side: (1) two platforms were horizontal competition (2) firm 1 had the advantage in platform service (3) firm 2 had the advantage in platform service. The two firms might adopt four compatibility strategies: (i) Incompatible (ii) Two-way Compatible (iii) One-way Compatible-Software 1 on Platform 2 (S_1 P_2) (iv) One-way Compatible-Software 2 on Platform 1 (S_2 P_1).
We found that (1) When the competition of two platforms was horizontal, if consumers’ loyalty were high and the price difference between the two platforms was large, two-way compatible would be the equilibrium strategy. On the contrary, firm 2 would quit the market. (2) When firm 1 had advantages in both services, if consumers’ loyalty were low and the price difference between the two platforms was large, they would adopt two-way compatible strategy. In contrast, it was one-way compatible-S_2 P_1. (3) When firm 1 had advantage in software and firm 2 had advantage in platform service, two-way compatibility strategy would happen under the same conditions, otherwise, it was one-way compatible-S_1 P_2. Both focused on their advantageous service items.

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