本研究主要探討美國證管會強制採用XBRL申報財務報表對CEO超額薪酬之影響。過去，公司財報格式其檔案格式多為PDF、DOC、TXT，甚至為紙本文件，而這些檔案格式均無法提供使用者進行其它的資料處理，使用者若為分析比較，只能人工處理，降低使用者處理資訊之效率。強制採用XBRL後，除了降低人工資料處理成本，可提供報表使用者更有效率地進行跨公司、跨期間及跨產業的分析比較，增加資訊透明度，進而強化對CEO薪酬之監督，有助於減少代理問題。本研究以2006年至2014年美國上市公司為研究對象，採用差異中之差異法(difference in difference)研究方法，探討強制採用XBRL對CEO超額薪酬之影響，以迴歸方式進行實證研究。實證結果顯示，強制採用XBRL後，會降低CEO正超額薪酬之情形，但對CEO負超額薪酬之現象，無顯著證據顯示會提高。

In this study, we examine whether mandatory XBRL adoption reduces CEO excess compensation during SEC mandated years. The mandatory adoption of XBRL, in addition to eliminating costly manual procedures, can likely enhance transparency in financial reporting, timeliness in data analysis, increase the accessibility of firm-specific financial information by a variety of user groups, and strengthen the monitoring of CEO compensation, helping reduce the agency problem. This study takes US listed companies from 2006 to 2014 as its research objects, and it uses the differences in different research methods to explore the impact of mandatory XBRL on CEO over- or undercompensation and to conduct empirical research in a regressive manner. The results show that the situation of CEOs who are overcompensated is improved after XBRL adoption, while there is no difference on the situation of CEOs who are undercompensated.

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