本研究旨在探討獨立董事任期與公司股價崩跌風險之關聯。股價崩跌風險反映企業資訊不透明或內部監督失靈下，負面消息累積並集中揭露所引發的市場劇烈反應，董事會作為公司治理的核心機制，在促進資訊揭露與監督管理階層上扮演關鍵角色，而獨立董事之任期長短則可能影響其履職效果，進而牽動資訊傳遞與市場風險。本研究實證結果顯示，獨立董事任期與股價崩跌風險之間存在正相關，意即較長任期可能提高資訊不對稱與潛在治理失衡，增加企業面臨股價崩跌的風險。此外，進一步的橫斷面測試指出，在缺乏外部監督力量的公司中，長任期對股價崩跌風險的影響更加明顯，顯示內部治理機制若無外部制衡，其股價崩跌風險可能增加。最後穩健性支持主要迴歸結果，顯示長任期與資訊不透明、進而導致崩跌風險的機制具有一致性與解釋力。

This study examines the association between independent directors’ tenure and the stock price crash risk. Stock price crash risk reflects the market’s severe reaction to the accumulation and concentrated disclosure of negative information under condition of corporate information opacity or internal supervision failure. As the core mechanism of corporate governance, the board of directors plays a crucial role in promoting information disclosure and supervising management. The length of independent directors’ tenure may influence their effectiveness in fulfilling their duties, thereby affecting information transmission and market risk. The empirical results indicate a positive correlation between independent directors’ tenure and stock price crash risk, suggesting that longer tenure may increase information asymmetry and potential governance imbalances, thereby increasing the stock price crash risk. Furthermore, additional cross-sectional tests reveal that the impact of long tenure on crash risk is more pronounced in companies lacking external monitoring, indicating that internal governance mechanisms without external checks may increase the stock price crash risk. Finally, robustness tests support the main regression results, demonstrating long tenure is consistent with and explanatory of the mechanism of information opacity, which in turn leads to crash risk.

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