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研究生： 鄭雅云
Cheng, Ya-yun
論文名稱： Financial Analyst and the Value of Cash Holdings
Financial Analyst and the Value of Cash Holdings
指導教授： 簡金成
Chien, Chin-Chen
黃炳勳
Huang, Pinghusn
學位類別： 博士
Doctor
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年： 2009
畢業學年度： 97
語文別： 英文
論文頁數： 73
外文關鍵詞： Information Asymmetry, Monitoring Mechanism, Cash Holdings, Financial Analyst
相關次數： 點閱：105  下載：6 
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    • In this paper, we examine investors’ valuations of corporate cash holdings to explicitly isolate the monitoring effect from the information effect of financial analysts. Using a sample of 14,884 firm-years spanning the period 1999-2007, we find that the value of a dollar of cash is substantially less if a firm has high level of financial analyst forecast inaccuracy. We also document that the marginal value of cash ranges from $0.34 to $0.44 for firms with high analyst forecast inaccuracy. Particularly, the marginal value of cash is worth about $1.82 for firms with low analyst forecast inaccuracy. Consistent with the monitoring effectiveness hypothesis, our findings suggest that financial analysts play an external monitoring role in determining corporate cash policy and prevent managers or controlling shareholders from retaining cash to acquire private control benefit, which in turn lead to a higher market value. The findings in this paper contribute to the debate on the monitoring role of financial analyst.

    1. Introduction 1 2. Background, Hypotheses and Related Literature 6 2.1 Analysts’ Informational Role 6 2.2 Analysts’ Monitoring Role 10 2.3 Information Asymmetry, Agency Conflict and Cash Holdings in Firms 12 2.3.1 Tradeoff theory 13 2.3.2 Financing hierarchy theory 14 2.3.3 Agency model 15 2.4 Two Competing Hypotheses 16 3. Research Design and Data 19 3.1 Main Regression Specification 19 3.1.1 Change in Cash--The Approach by Faulkender and Wang (2006) 19 3.1.2 Level of Cash--The Approach by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) 23 3.2 Sample Construction 27 3.3 Measures of Financial Analyst Forecast Inaccuracy 27 3.4 Summary Statistics 29 4. Empirical results 33 4.1 Preliminary Test 33 4.2 Change in Cash 33 4.3 Level of Cash 38 4.4 Robustness Test 43 5. Conclusion 46 REFERENCES 49 List of Tables Table 1. Definitions of Variables 56 Table 2. Sample Selection Procedure 57 Table 3. Summary of Sample Composite by Industry 58 Table 4. The Summary Statistics for the Original Variables in the 1999-2007 Sample 59 Table 5. The Pearson Correlation Matrix and the Summary Statistics for the Deflated Variables Used in the FW Model 60 Table 6. The Impact of the Number of Analyst Following on the Value of Cash using Returns Regressions 61 Table 7. Regression Results for the 1999-2007 Sample 62 Table 8. Regression Results for the 1999-2007--Split Samples 64 Table 9. The Marginal Value of Cash for the Average Firm 66 Table 10. The Summary Statistics for the Original Variables in the KL Model Sample 67 Table 11. The Pearson Correlation Matrix of Deflated Variables Used in the KL Regression Analysis 68 Table 12. The Relation between Cash Holdings and Forecast Inaccuracy 69 Table 13. The Relation between Firm Value, Forecast Inaccuracy and Cash Holdings 70 Table 14. The Relation between Firm Value, Forecast Inaccuracy and Cash Holdings- Forecast Inaccuracy Deciles Portfolio 71 Table 15. The Relation between Firm Value, Forecast Inaccuracy and Cash Holdings- Forecast Inaccuracy LOW-HIGH Portfolio 72 Table 16. The Relation between Firm Value, Forecast Inaccuracy and Cash Holdings- Only the Highest and the Lowest Agency Conflicts in the Portfolio are Shown 73

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