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研究生： 蔡明澤
Tsai, Ming-Tse
論文名稱： 策略聯盟經驗是否影響購併之股價表現
Do previous alliance experiences affect the acquisition performance
指導教授： 張紹基
Chang, Shao-Chi
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 國際企業研究所
Institute of International Business
論文出版年： 2006
畢業學年度： 94
語文別： 英文
論文頁數： 39
中文關鍵詞： 資訊不對稱 、買賣雙方過去的策略聯盟 、購併
外文關鍵詞： information asymmetry, bidder-target alliance, acquisition
相關次數： 點閱：125  下載：8 
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    • 過去十年間，購併是經常被應用的公司策略，許多研究者因而開始關心購併的表現。然而大多數的實證結果指出，公司進行購併後的表現並不如預期。因此學者們試圖探究購併表現不佳的原因。
    策略聯盟是組織之間經常建立的合作關係，過去的文獻指出策略聯盟提供了公司從聯盟伙伴學習知識、獲取資訊的機會。因此我們認為購併雙方如果擁有過去策略聯盟的經驗，購併過程中的資訊不對稱可以因而降低，並改善購併表現。
    文獻指出非水平產業購併通常隱含較多的資訊不對稱，因此我們認為過去與購併目標公司的策略聯盟的經驗，對於非水平產業的購併後表現有較大的影響力。
    我們預期策略聯盟的經驗可以降低購併過程中因為資訊不對稱所帶來的風險，因此我們認為當公司在購併的過程中面對程度較高的資訊不對稱時，主購併公司可能會偏好在購併前先與目標公司進行策略聯盟。
    本研究將從SDC資料庫蒐集1993年-2000年之間美國國內購併事件進行分析，以1989年-2000年之間美國國內策略聯盟的事件來追溯購併前的策略聯盟關係。我們將採用公司宣告當日起三年的股票買入持有報酬衡量主購併公司的購併後表現，並導入相關的模型對樣本進行分析以及假設驗證。
    我們的研究結果發現在購併事件中，買賣雙方過去的策聯盟經驗對於主購併公司在購併後的表現有正向的影響，即使在控制了其他相關的解釋變數後，策略聯盟經驗對於購併表現的影響依然維持顯著。在本研究樣本中，購併非公開發行公司時，買賣雙方有較高的比例擁有過去策略聯盟的經驗，然而在購併高科技產業與服務業相關的公司時，主購併公司並沒有偏好採用購併前策略聯盟之趨勢。產業差異對於策略聯盟經驗在購併表現的影響在本研究中也沒有顯著的效果。

    In the past decades, acquisition is a frequently used strategy. Researchers are interested in the post-acquisition performance. But most of the empirical results are disappointing. We try to propose an approach to bring bidders the better performance.
    Previous studies indicated that the alliances provide an opportunity for company to learn from partners. Therefore, we propose that the previous bidder and target’s alliances could cut down the information asymmetry and positively influence the acquisition performance.
    Whether the acquisition is non-horizontal or not is adopted as the moderator in the analysis. Non-horizontal acquisitions usually involve more information asymmetry, thus we expect prior alliances experiences are more influential in non-horizontal acquisition.
    Since we expect the alliances experiences with target could reduce the risk from information asymmetry, we suggest that the acquirers which face high level of information asymmetry are more likely to make alliances with target before acquisition.
    In this paper, we collect the US domestic acquisitions events between 1993 and 2000, and alliances events are between 1989 and 2000 from SDC. We use the post-acquisition 3-year buy-and-hold return in stock to measure the bidders’ performance, and to test our arguments.
    Our results support that the bidder-target alliances experiences let the bidders get better performance. The bidders possibly have prior bidder-target alliance when acquiring a nonpublic target firm. In contrast, we find the different industry background doesn’t have obvious moderating effect, and the bidders don’t tend to make alliances prior acquisitions as acquiring high technology or service target firms.

    I. Introduction............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Background ..................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Motivation ....................................................................................................... 2 II. Literature review and Hypotheses ......................................................................... 4 2.1 Poor post-acquisition performance.................................................................. 4 2.2 What elements affect the post acquisition performance?................................ 4 2.3 Accesses for moderating information asymmetry........................................... 5 2.4 Alliance effect in different condition............................................................... 9 III. Sample and Methodology................................................................................... 13 3.1 Sample collection .......................................................................................... 13 3.2 Measure the long-term security returns......................................................... 13 3.3 The dependent variable ................................................................................. 14 3.4 The independent variable .............................................................................. 15 3.5 Moderator ...................................................................................................... 15 3.6 Control variables ........................................................................................... 16 3.7 Model ............................................................................................................ 18 IV. Empirical Results................................................................................................ 21 4.1 Descriptive Statistics ..................................................................................... 21 4.2 Post-acquisition performance........................................................................ 23 4.3 Cross-sectional regression analysis............................................................... 27 4.4 Acquisition in information asymmetry conditions ........................................ 30 V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 33 Reference.................................................................................................................. 36 List of Table Table 4-1 Sample distribution ............................................................................. 21 Table 4-2 Sample characteristics......................................................................... 22 Table 4-3 The correlation matrix of variables ..................................................... 23 Table 4-4 Results of Fama-French three factor model ........................................ 25 Table 4-5 Results of the Carhart Four factors model .......................................... 26 Table 4-6 Cross-section regression of 3-years buy and hold return .................... 29 Table 4-7 Return in acquisition with high asymmetry information: ................... 30 Table 4-8 Logistic regressions............................................................................. 32 Table 5-1 Abnormal return around the acquisition announcement date.............. 35

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