本研究為特殊事件分析，通過實證研究經理人替換對於股價波動的影響性，並利用離職者及繼任者的類型分別探討不同的波動程度，發現遭強制解僱及自願離職者皆顯著增加股價波動度，但也發現隨著時間推移，當投資人越了解公司前景時，強制撤換之公司股價波動會減少。另一方面，與過去研究不同，我們發現當台灣公司發生經理人替換，且繼任者為內部人的情況下，股價的波動程度會相較於外部繼任者來的顯著。我們使用大量的台灣上市公司樣本進行測試，期間為 2001年到 2019年。我們的證據表明，經理人之替換會顯著影響公司股價的波動程度，並以不同替換類型導致不同的結果。

This paper is an event study empirically investigating the effect on volatility change of stock price after a CEO turnover event. Using different types of turnover events by departures and successors, we explore the level of volatility respectively. CEO who is forced to dismiss or fired and those who are defined as voluntary departures both significantly increase stock volatility. On the other hand, we find that when the new CEO successor is an insider, the change in volatility of the stock price will be more significant than external successor. We use sample of publicly listed firms in Taiwan in the period of 2001 to 2019, our empirical evidence shows that there is significant change in volatility of stock price after turnover event.

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