社會中會發生無法預先捕捉之事件，如金融危機、天然災害；更甚隨著當今技術發達、經濟瞬息萬變，無法預測之狀況更容易隨之而來，如技術創新、替代品問世，這些皆無法以布朗運動捕捉。因此本文探討在跳躍擴散假設下，檢驗無法預期之突發事件對公司最佳投資決策的影響。研究建立在 Sarkar 和 Zhang (2015a) 下，探討企業使用績效敏感債務和傳統型債務融資之差異；接著以Merton (1976) 跳躍過程延伸探討，預期將跳躍因子加入模型後，能更真實地探討對於最佳投資決策帶來之變化。我們發現：(1)藉由設計出一組績效敏感補償係數，能計算出最佳投資時點，消除投資不足並將代理成本降低至零；(2)考量跳躍因子後，我們證明需要更高的投資觸發點才能使投資者達到原先（不考量跳躍）的價值，對未來價格無法預測的不確定性會使投資者採取行動前更為保守。在充滿跳躍風險下，融資時導入績效敏感債務可以緩解投資不足的問題。

Unpredictable events such as financial crisis and natural catastrophe occur increasingly frequently. Moreover, with advanced technology and rapidly changing economy, unpredictable events are more likely to occur, such as technological innovation and substitute appears. None of these can be captured by Brownian motion. Thus, this study investigates the impact of sudden incidents on the firm's optimal investment decisions under the jump-diffusion model. Based on Sarkar and Zhang (2015a), we discuss the difference between fixed-coupon debt and performance-sensitive debt financing. Then we take Merton (1976)’s jump process for extension. As expected, after adding jump effect to the model, we can explore the changes more realistically. We show that (1) By designing a performance-sensitivity coefficient, optimal investment trigger can be found and eliminate underinvestment problems. (2) After taking jump effect into consideration, we show that a higher trigger is required for investors to reach the value without considering jump effect. Uncertainty will cause investors more conservative before taking investment and financing action. With jump risks, adding performance-sensitive debt to financing can ease the problem of underinvestment.

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