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研究生: 張介銘
Chang, Chieh-ming
論文名稱: 持續性高現金儲備政策對公司長期營運績效 與長期股價之影響
The Effects of Persistent Policies of Large Holdings of Cash on Long-Run Operating Performance and Stock Returns
指導教授: 許溪南
Hsu, Hsinan
姜傳益
Chiang, Chwan-Yi
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 企業管理學系
Department of Business Administration
論文出版年: 2004
畢業學年度: 92
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 99
中文關鍵詞: 持續性高現金儲備經營績效公司成長股價報酬
外文關鍵詞: firm growth, persistent large cash holdings, operating performance, stock return
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  • 適當現金管理政策可使公司日常營運有效率的運行。採取「持續性保守型」現金管理政策往往容易引人注目,因為以投資報酬率的觀點來看,持續性地持有龐大現金部位是一種無謂浪費。不過如果從另一方面來看保守的現金管理政策可以使得公司避免高昂的債務代理成本以及可以適時利用手中充裕的現金部位來掌握稍縱即逝的投資機會。因為上述兩種說法有著南轅北轍差距,所以本研究目的是冀求能回答上述疑問並提出合理解釋。
    本研究以民國82-87年間,每年年底所持有的現金部位比例皆位於該所屬產業前五分之二的公司為目標公司。並另外設計出三組「同產業、同規模」,但是分別採取不同現金管理政策的公司做為對比公司,利用t檢定來檢視在不同現金管理政策下的公司特徵變數以及公司長期營運績效是否存有顯著差異。此外,也應用Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995)衡量長期股價報酬的方法來檢視台灣上市公司採持續性高現金儲備政策後的長期報酬。最後,設計出兩組迴歸模型來檢視持有高現金儲備比例的動機與影響其營運績效表現的因素為何。
    本研究發現「持續性保守型」現金管理公司的長期績效表現並不亞於對比公司甚至還要更優。本研究也發現內部人持股比例並沒有辦法解釋公司績效的差異,而且也沒有證據指出內部人持股比例會傷害股東權益與妨礙公司發展。此外,採取「持續性保守型」現金管理政策顯然可以降低外部融資,避免較大的債務代理成本,而且可以滿足公司成長機會所需的現金需求,但是並沒有證據顯示出採取採取此一現金管理政策是為了要保持公司財務彈性,避免財務危機發生。所以綜合上述,本研究認為採取「持續性保守型」現金管理政策並不會傷害股東利益和扼殺公司績效表現,相反的,可以利用龐大現金部位支持公司的成長與發展。

    Appropriate cash management policy can make firms carry on business more efficiently. Persistent policies of large holdings of cash are easy to attract many people’s attention, because they think persistently large cash holdings are waste. In contrast to above view, some scholars think that firms, which adopt persistent policies of large holdings of cash, can reduce their costs of external financing. Furthermore, this policy can support investment and growth. These two viewpoints are diametrically opposed to each other. Therefore, the main purpose of the study is to investigate this argument.
    This study investigates the firms that held higher than 19.6﹪of their assets as cash and cash equivalents at the end of each of the years 1993 through 1998 and this ratio higher than 60 per cent of all firms. In addition, the study designs another three sets of firms that are matched by size and industry but adopt different cash management policies. This study uses the simple t-test to investigate the difference among this firms, which adopt differ cash management policies. Also, this study employs Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) long-run adjusted return to study if there exists long-run abnormal returns for persistent policies of large holdings of cash. Finally, this study uses two regression analyses to estimate the effect of cash holdings on operating performance and analyzes the operating performance of high cash firms.
    Following the 19-season period, the operating performance of high cash firms is comparable to or greater than the performance of a size- and industry-matched control samples. Form this study, evidence shows that insider ownership does not explain the better performance of firms with high cash holdings. Also, no evidence shows that insider ownership could harm stockholders and hinder performance. From this study, evidence shows that firms with persistently large cash holdings can reduce the use of external financing and use large cash holdings to facilitate investment and growth. Finally, little evidence shows that firms adopt persistent policies of large holdings of cash just in order to avoid financial distress. To summarize, results indicate that firms with persistently large cash holdings can use large cash to support growth opportunities and have comparable or greater performance than that of a size- and industry-matched control samples.
     

    表目錄 ………………………………………………………………………………V 圖目錄 ……………………………………………………………………………VI 第壹章 緒論 ………………………………………………………………………1 第一節 研究動機 …………………………………………………………………1 第二節 研究目的 …………………………………………………………………5 第三節 研究範圍 …………………………………………………………………6 第四節 本文架構與流程 …………………………………………………………7 第貳章 文獻探討 …………………………………………………………………10 第一節 持有高現金準備的動機 …………………………………………………10 第二節 高現金儲備與公司績效關聯探討之相關文獻 …………………………20 第參章 研究方法與研究設計 ……………………………………………………21 第一節 模型建立與研究方法說明 ………………………………………………21 第二節 研究設計 …………………………………………………………………23 第二節 模式建立與研究方法說明 ………………………………………………25 第肆章 實證結果 …………………………………………………………………49 第一節 敘述統計 …………………………………………………………………44 第二節 「持續性保守型」現金管理政策公司的特徵 …………………………50 第三節 「持續性保守型」現金管理政策公司的長期績效表現 ………………65 第四節 持有高額現金儲備的動機 ………………………………………………73 第五節 「持續性保守型」現金管理政策公司之長期績效迴歸模型 …………77 第六節 現金部位使用情形分析 …………………………………………………78 第伍章 結論與建議 ………………………………………………………………82 第一節 結論 ………………………………………………………………………82 第二節 建議 ………………………………………………………………………84 參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………85 附錄 ………………………………………………………………………………90

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