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研究生： 林君哲
Lin, Chun-Che
論文名稱： 在TFT-LCD驅動IC供應鏈中探討檢驗率與購買價及協商機制之研究
A Coordination Mechanism for Inspection Policy and Purchase Price in a TFT-LCD Driver IC Supply Chain
指導教授： 謝中奇
Hsieh, Chung-Chi
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 管理學院 - 工業與資訊管理學系
Department of Industrial and Information Management
論文出版年： 2011
畢業學年度： 99
語文別： 中文
論文頁數： 51
中文關鍵詞： 檢測策略 、供應鏈 、賽局理論 、協商機制
外文關鍵詞： Inspection policy, Supply chain, Game theory, Coordination mechanism
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    • TFT-LCD產業由於生產過程複雜，需要許多零件供應商配合生產，其中驅動 IC為LCD面板的關鍵零件，因此驅動IC的品質更顯得重要。驅動IC的設計公司除了擁有良好的設計人才與市場趨勢的遠見之外，更需要有良好的零件供應商與封裝測試廠配合，設計公司才能提供給面板廠優良的驅動IC。為此，設計公司正積極尋找提升產品品質及降低成本的方法，而供應商則希望能作最佳的決策以獲取最大利益，供應鏈成員之間如何取得平衡達到雙贏已經是實務上的重要課題。

    因此，本論文針對一個以驅動IC設計公司為主導的供應鏈進行研究，設計公司將設計好的驅動IC零件發包給各零件供應商進行生產，並且委託單一封裝廠進行組裝與測試。此一類型之供應鏈，成員間無須對其他成員負責，只須對設計公司負責，並訂定買賣契約。本研究在零件供應商出貨前進行全檢，且檢驗過程不會有誤宰或誤放的前提下，考量設計公司決定封裝購買價格、封裝測試廠決定出貨檢驗率，並建構出封裝測試廠與驅動IC設計公司的利潤函式，依據依序賽局的求解方法求出封裝測試廠與設計公司的最佳均衡策略。另外，本研究也提出一個加入利益分享機制的協商合約，設計公司可以藉由檢驗成本的分攤與封裝購買價格的調整來誘使封裝廠作出對整體供應鏈最佳的決策，我們更進一步利用數值分析的方法驗證此協商合約確實能使供應鏈獲取集中式系統的最大利潤，使得分散式系統的成員皆受益。

    This thesis examines a system that consists of a two-stage supply chain and a dominant driver IC designer who outsources the production to a supplier and an assembly house. It assumes that the supplier adopts complete outbound inspection, and the inspection accuracy of both the supplier and the assembly house is perfect. In our model, the IC designer determines the price paid to the assembly house and the assembly house decides its outbound inspection policy. We explore the interactions between the pricing strategy of the IC designer and outbound inspection policy of the assembly house in a sequential game. In addition, we examine the contract with revenue-sharing mechanism in a decentralized chain which can perform as well as the centralized chain, where the contract parameters include the share of the unit inspection cost and the purchase price. We further provide numerical analysis to study the equilibrium strategies and the members' profits.

    摘要 i Abstract ii 誌謝 iii 表目錄 vi 圖目錄 vii 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景與動機..........................................1 1.2 研究目的.......................................................2 1.3 研究流程.......................................................2 1.4 研究架構.......................................................4 第二章 文獻探討 6 2.1 檢驗政策.......................................................6 2.2 品質改善.......................................................7 2.3 協商機制.......................................................8 2.4 賽局理論.....................................................10 2.5 小結............................................................12 第三章 模式建構與發展 13 3.1 模式環境.....................................................13 3.1.1 模式假設..................................................14 3.1.2 符號定義..................................................15 3.2 分散式系統.................................................16 3.2.1 利潤函式建構...........................................18 3.2.2 分散式系統下之均衡決策.......................21 3.2.3 決策變數範圍之探討..............................22 3.3 集中式系統.................................................24 3.4 協商合約.....................................................25 3.4.1 加入協商之分散式系統..........................26 3.4.2 協商合約制訂..........................................27 3.5 決策與獲利改善分析.................................29 3.6 小結..............................................................30 第四章 數值分析與參數敏感度分析 31 4.1 數值分析.....................................................31 4.1.1 參數設定..................................................32 4.1.2 各模式決策與獲利比較..........................33 4.2 參數敏感度分析........................................33 4.2.1 檢驗成本函數之係數分析.......................34 4.2.2 罰金倍數分析..........................................37 4.2.3 產品售價分析...........................................41 4.2.4 良率分析...................................................43 4.3 小結..............................................................45 第五章 結論與未來研究方向 47 5.1 結論..............................................................47 5.2 未來研究方向.............................................48 參考文獻 49

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