本研究以2026年4月1日施行之成屋交易資訊揭露新制為研究對象，從法規治理與企業管理觀點，探討其對中古成屋交易資訊透明度、交易安全及不動產經紀業管理之初期作用。中古成屋之屋況、修繕紀錄、設備權責與社區資訊，常具有隱蔽性、分散性及專業判讀門檻，使買方於締約前面臨資訊落差與查核風險。
本研究採探索性質性研究，整合搜尋－經驗－信任財產品分類理論（SEC）、資訊不對稱、交易成本及委託－代理理論，運用文獻分析、法規與司法實務研析、半結構式訪談及主題分析法，訪談工程檢測專業人員、不動產經紀業者及購屋消費者共11位，並以資訊能否被取得、查核、記載、說明、理解與留存，作為資訊透明度之分析主軸。
研究發現，新制將混凝土氯離子含量檢測資訊、用戶加壓受水設備及其維護責任、太陽光電發電設備與建築能效標示等事項，納入交易前確認、記載或說明程序，使重要資訊得以提前進入交易流程，並形成可供查核、說明及責任回溯之紀錄基礎。其初期作用主要表現在風險資訊前移、交易文件標準化及說明程序留痕，有助於提升交易前資訊處理之完整性與可追溯性。
整體而言，新制在規範設計上，使部分風險事項具備於締約前被提出、記載、說明及留存的程序條件。本文提出外部揭露規範進入企業內部作業之制度執行鏈，說明經紀業者可透過資料取得與來源查核、文件記載、風險說明、主管覆核、教育訓練、案件分流及專業轉介，將法規要求轉化為可執行、可覆核及可追溯之管理程序，作為程序性交易安全與服務品質管理之基礎；惟其實際效果仍有待長期案件、客訴及爭議資料驗證。

This study examines, from regulatory governance and business management perspectives, Taiwan’s disclosure requirements for existing-home transactions, effective April 1, 2026, and their initial role in information transparency, transaction security, and brokerage management. Information on property conditions, repair histories, equipment responsibilities, and community management is concealed, dispersed, or difficult to interpret, creating pre-contract information gaps and verification risks.
Using an exploratory qualitative design, the study integrates the Search–Experience–Credence framework, information asymmetry, transaction cost theory, and principal–agent theory. Methods include literature review, legal analysis, and thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with 11 inspection professionals, brokerage practitioners, and homebuyers. Information transparency is assessed through acquisition, verification, documentation, explanation, comprehension, and retention.
The revised requirements bring chloride-ion testing, user-side pressurized water-receiving equipment and maintenance responsibilities, solar photovoltaic equipment, and building energy-efficiency labeling into pre-contract procedures. They move risk information forward, clarify documents, and create traceable records.
The study proposes an institutional implementation chain through which brokerage firms translate disclosure duties into executable, reviewable, and traceable procedures involving source verification, documentation, risk explanation, supervisory review, training, case triage, and professional referral. These procedures provide a basis for procedural transaction security and service quality, while their effects require longitudinal verification using transaction, complaint, and dispute data.

一、中文部分（依筆畫排序）
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陳明燦（2009）。論我國不動產經紀業不公平競爭相關法律問題。公平交易季刊，17（2），139–186。
陳建元（2024）。不動產經紀業管理條例之回顧與前瞻：理想與現實的落差。不動產研究，2024（3），24–33。https://doi.org/10.30206/JORER.202409_(3).0002
曾品傑（2023）。物之瑕疵——最高法院112年度台上字第924號。裁判解讀：民事法，2023（9），1–2。元照出版。
詹森林（1998）。消費者保護法與預售屋買賣定型化契約。國立臺灣大學法學論叢，27（4），99–115。https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.1998.27.04.06
廖欽福、林晴瑋、龔俊維（2022）。政府資訊公開與不動產消費爭議資訊揭露之挑戰。南臺財經法學，8，1–40。

二、英文部分（依字母排序）
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三、政府資料與法規命令
民法。全國法規資料庫。
消費者保護法。全國法規資料庫。
不動產經紀業管理條例。全國法規資料庫。
成屋買賣定型化契約應記載及不得記載事項。內政部主管法規查詢系統。
不動產說明書應記載及不得記載事項。內政部主管法規查詢系統。
內政部（2025）。《成屋買賣定型化契約應記載及不得記載事項》修正總說明及修正對照表。民國114年12月19日修正，自民國115年4月1日生效。
內政部（2026）。《不動產說明書應記載及不得記載事項》第二點、第三點修正總說明及修正規定對照表。民國115年1月13日修正發布，自民國115年4月1日生效。
自來水法。全國法規資料庫。
建築物混凝土結構設計規範。內政部主管法規查詢系統。
內政部不動產資訊平台（2026）。房地產消費糾紛原因統計。取自內政部不動產資訊平台，檢索日期：民國115年6月。

四、司法裁判
最高法院105年度台上字第65號民事判決。
最高法院107年度台上字第2072號民事判決。
最高法院110年度台上字第3213號民事判決。
最高法院112年度台上字第924號民事判決。
臺灣高等法院112年度上字第996號民事判決。
臺灣高等法院113年度上更一字第59號民事判決。
臺灣高等法院114年度重上字第515號民事判決。
臺灣桃園地方法院112年度重訴字第421號民事判決。
臺灣臺中地方法院114年度中簡字第66號民事判決。