本研究利用中國股票市場獨特的特徵，透過下列五個問題，檢驗二替代理論-援助之手理論與攫取之手理論。一、所有權類型影響公司股利政策？二、所有權類型影響公司現金持有量？三、地區開發程度影響公司現金持有政策？四、所有權類型影響公司持有超額現金之價值？五、在不考慮所有權類型下，地區差異影響公司持有超額現金之價值？
本文研究發現公司股利政策與攫取之手理論一致；亦即中央政府控制下的公司較地方政府控制與私有控制下的公司支付較少股利。當考慮所有權類型與公司現金持有量之關係時，則支持援助之手理論；亦即中央政府控制下的國營企業最無動機囤積現金。相較於公司設立在較開發地區，公司設立在較不開發地區持有較多現金。此外，所有權類型對公司持有超額現金之價值具有正面影響，符合援助之手理論。然而，地區開發差異性對公司持有超額現金之價值具有負面影響，此結果與攫取之手理論一致。
總結，極端錯綜複雜的中國股票市場需要數個理論以解釋本研究之結果。政治與代理理論之糾結關係在剛起飛的中國股票市場尚無法實踐公司治理。

This study utilizes the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market to test two alternative theories that have been thus far inconclusive, the helping hand theory and grabbing hand theory. I developed five hypotheses based on these two alternative theories, respectively. My investigation poses the following questions: 1. Does the type of ownership affect corporate dividend policy? 2. Does the type of ownership affect corporate cash holding levels? 3. Does the extent of regional development have an impact on the corporate cash holdings policy? 4. Does the type of ownership affect the value of excess cash holdings? 5. Does the regional disparity affect the value of excess cash holdings regardless of the ownership types?
My empirical results show that the corporate dividend policy is generally consistent with the grabbing hand theory as suggested in the first hypothesis. It indicates that the centrally controlled firms pay fewer dividends than locally controlled and privately owned firms, even though the former outperforms the latter. However, when testing the second hypothesis regarding the level of cash holding among different types of ownership, I produced favorable results for the helping hand theory. This suggests that the centrally controlled state-owned firms have the least motives to hoard cash, and the finding is further enhanced by a robustness test. I also found that firms located in less developed regions hold more cash than their counterparts. Furthermore, the value of excess cash holdings is positively affected by the ownership type, being consistent with the helping hand theory. Nevertheless, the value of excess cash holdings is negatively affected by the disparity of regional development, and the result is consistent with the grabbing hand theory in this case.
I concluded that the intricacies of Chinese stock market are extremely complex; thus, several theories are required to explain the outcomes. In this respect, the intertwined relationship between politics and the agency problem fails to allow for corporate governance in this newly fledged stock market.

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