本研究旨在探討關鍵查核事項(KAM)對審計品質的影響，依據審計準則701號「查核報告中關鍵查核事項之溝通」，會計師在決定關鍵查核事項時，通常涉及以下三項因素：(1)所評估重大不實表達風險較高之領域，或依審計準則315號「辨認並評估重大不實表達風險」所辨認存有顯著風險之領域；(2)對財務報表中涉及管理階層重大判斷之領域(包括已辨認具高度估計不確定性之會計估計)，查核人員所作之重大判斷；(3)對財務報導期間所發生之重大事件或交易對查核之影響。本研究將這三項「高度關注之事項」領域分別標示為第一類、第二類及第三類。

本研究以2016年至2023年台灣上市(櫃)公司，並排除金融業及KY公司為樣本，並以裁決性應計數之絕對值為審計品質之代理變數。結果顯示同時揭露涉及重大不實表達風險(第一類)和管理階層重大判斷(第二類)的關鍵查核事項時，對審計品質並無顯著提升；僅揭露涉及管理階層重大判斷和高度估計不確定性(第二類)之關鍵查核事項時，審計品質顯著優於僅揭露第一類或第三類關鍵查核事項，但加入年度和產業固定效果後，僅揭露第二類之關鍵查核事項對審計品質的影響不再顯著，顯示出年度和行業特性在審計品質分析中的重要性；當查核報告全盤揭露第一類、第二類及第三類關鍵查核事項時，審計品質反而與未同時揭露第一類、第二類及第三類之關鍵查核事項時顯著較差。

This study examines the impact of Key Audit Matters (KAM) on audit quality. According to TWSA 701, auditors consider three main factors when determining KAMs: (1) areas of higher assessed risk of material misstatement, or significant risks identified in accordance with TWSA 315; (2) significant auditor judgments relating to areas in the financial statements that involved significant management judgment, including accounting estimates that have been identified as having high estimation uncertainty; and (3) the effect on the audit of significant events or transactions that occurred during the period. These factors are categorized into Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3.

This study examines data from Taiwanese listed and OTC companies between 2016 and 2023, excluding financial institutions and KY companies. It uses the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. The findings indicate that disclosing Type 1 and Type 2 KAMs simultaneously does not significantly enhance audit quality. However, disclosing Type 2 KAMs alone shows a significant improvement in audit quality initially, but this effect diminishes after controlling for annual and industry fixed effects. Comprehensive disclosure of Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 KAMs, on the other hand, significantly reduces audit quality.

In conclusion, targeted disclosures emphasizing significant management judgment and high estimation uncertainty enhance audit quality. Conversely, broad disclosures covering various KAMs may diminish audit quality. Therefore, specific KAM disclosures prove more beneficial for improving audit quality than a comprehensive approach.

一、中文文獻
官月緞、史雅男、曾家璿(2022)，「關鍵查核事項揭露與審計品質及審計報告時效性之關聯」，中山管理評論，30卷4期: 705-754
二、英文文獻
Bartov, E. (1993). “The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation”. The Accounting Review 68, 4, 840-855.
Bédard, J., N. Gonthier-Besacier., and A. Schatt (2019). “Consequences of Expanded Audit Reports: Evidence from the Justifications of Assessments in France. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory. 38 (3): 23-45.
Brasel, K., M. M. Doxey, J. H. Grenier, A. Reffett (2016). Risk disclosure preceding negative outcomes: The effects of reporting critical audit matters on judgments of auditor liability. The Accounting Review 91 (5): 1345-1362.
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, 99-126.
Carcello, J. V., and C. Li. (2013). Costs and benefits of requiring an engagement partner signature: Recent experience in the United Kingdom. The Accounting Review 88, 5, 1511-1546.
Chalmers, J. (2013). “PwC Comment Letter on FRC Revision to ISA (UK and Ireland) 700: Requiring the auditor’s report to address risks of material misstatement, materiality and a summary of audit scope.”
Christensen, B. E., Glover, S. M., & Wolfe, C. J. (2014). Do critical audit matter paragraphs in the audit report change nonprofessional investors’ decision to invest? Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 33 (4): 71-93.
Council, F. R. (2013b). “Improving the Auditor’s Report: Note of a public meeting.” Available at: https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/c9f87ea8-62b2-493f-b106-de87b137bd90/FRC-Record-discussion-Public-meeting-28March13-Auditor-Reporting-Feb13-Consultation-Paper.pdf
Czerney, K., J. J. Schmidt , and A. M. Thompson. (2019). Do investors respond to explanatory language included in unqualified audit reports? Contemporary Accounting Research 36 (1): 198-229.
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3(3): 183-199.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney (1995). Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70, 2, 193-225
DeFond, M., and J. Zhang (2014). A review of archival auditing research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58 (2-3): 275-326.
Eshleman, J. D., and P. Guo (2014). Do big 4 auditors provide higher audit quality after controlling for the endogenous choice of auditor? Auditing : A Journal of Practice & Theory 33, 4, 197-219.
Gutierrez, E., Minutti-Meza, M., Tatum, K. W., & Vulcheva, M. (2018). Consequences of adopting an expanded auditor's report in the United Kingdom. Review of Accounting Studies, 23(4), 1543-1587.
IAASB. (2013). “Reporting on Audited Financial Statements: Proposed New and Revised International Standards on Auditing (ISAs).” Available at: https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/All%20Proposed%20ISAs%20Included%20in%20ED.pdf
IAASB. (2016). International Standard on Auditing 701: Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report.
IAASB (2023). IAASB Launches Consultation on Proposed Strategy and Work Plan for 2024-2027. Retrieved from IAASB.
IFAC (2023). Global Adoption of International Standards. Retrieved from IFAC.
Kachelmeier, S. J., D. Rimkus., J. J. Schmidt, and K. Valentine (2020). The forewarning effect of critical audit matter disclosures involving measurement uncertainty. Contemporary Accounting Research 37 (4): 2186-2212.
Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 375-400.
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). “Performance matched discretionary accrual measures” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 163-197.
Lennox, C. S., Schmidt, J. J., & Thompson, A. M. (2018). Is the expanded model of audit reporting informative to investors? Evidence from the UK. Contemporary Accounting Research, 35(2), 1220-1252.
Lennox, C. S., Schmidt, J. J., & Thompson, A. M. (2021). Why are expanded audit reports not informative to investors? Evidence from the UK. Working Paper. University of Southern California, University of Texas at Austin, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Li, T., Hay, D., & Lau, D. (2019). Assessing the impact of the new auditor’s report. Pacific Accounting Review, 31(1), 110-132.
Moses, O.D. (1987). Income smoothing and incentives: Empirical tests using accounting changes. The Accounting Review, 62, 358-377.
Overend, R. (2013). “EY Comment Letter on FRC Revision to ISA (UK and Ireland) 700: Requiring the auditor’s report to address risks of material misstatement, materiality and a summary of audit scope.”
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). (2017). The Auditor's Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion and Related Amendments.
Reichelt, K. J., and D. Wang (2010). National and office-specific measures of auditor industry expertise and effects on audit quality. Journal of Accounting Research 48, 3, 647-686.
Reid, L. C. (2018). An auditor and audit committee report changes useful to investors? Evidence from the United Kingdom. Doctoral Dissertation. University of Tennessee.
Reid, L. C., J. V. Carcello, C. Li, T. L. Neal, and J. R. Francis (2019). “Impact of auditor report changes on financial reporting quality and audit costs: Evidence from the United Kingdom.” Contemporary Accounting Research 36(3): 1501-1539
Sirois, L. P., J. Bédard, and P. Bera (2018). The informational value of key audit matters in the auditor’s report: Evidence from an eye-tracking study. Accounting Horizons 32 (2): 141-162.
Wallace, W. A. (1980). The economic role of the audit in free and regulated markets. New York, NY: University of Rochester
Warfield, T. D., Wild J. J., & Wild, K. L. (1995). “Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 61-91.