追求最大利潤是供應鏈中，每家公司所設定的主要目標之一。供應鏈管理最主要的概念是將各商業功能有系統且有策略的協調整合，且此整合決策必須使公司內跨部門與整體供應鏈間跨企業的相互合作，目的是為了令單一企業與整體供應鏈的長期績效得到改善；如此環環相扣的特性，使各家廠商在做決策時，皆會影響到其上下游廠商之價格與數量，因此在為求取各自利潤最大化的條件下，企業間將會產生各種形式的合作關係，形成一種供應鏈上下游成員競合之賽局。

因此本研究利用賽局理論中競爭與合作的觀念，探討以供應商、製造商與零售商三者所構成之供應鏈競合關係；首先就結構分為兩個部份，第一部份為製造商與零售商之兩階層競合模式分析，第二部份則再加入供應商，形成三階層競合模式分析接著再將零售商以合作與競爭的方式分為兩類加以探討；以零售商為主要探討之目標廠商，其中考量包含替代性質之上游廠商，以及上游廠商所提供之價格與數量不相同，因而形成零售商依據成本判斷訂貨數量之問題。本研究主要的目的是站在零售商之角度，建構一個賽局模型，透過參考數據的驗證，探討零售商在競合賽局下之各型態。

Pursuing profit maximization is one of the major subjects setting by every firm in the supply chain. The main concept of the management in the supply chain is to cohere and integrate each business function systematically and strategically and this integrating policy decision must let the cross-sections in the firms and the cross-enterprises in the entire supply chain cooperate to each other, in order to improve the longterm performance of single enterprise and of the entire supply chain; such an interconnected character will let every decision-making by each firm affect the price and quality of its upstream and downstream firms, therefore under the condition of pursuing profit maximization separately, the enterprises will have varied forms cooperative relations and then develop a competitive and cooperative game of upstream and downstream members.

Hence this research uses the idea of competition and cooperation in game theory to discuss the relationship of competition and cooperation in the supply chain which is formed by suppliers, manufacturers and retailers. Firstly, for the structure, we divide it into two parts: the first part is the analysis to the two-echelon competitive and cooperative model of manufacturers and retailers; then we add the suppliers to the second part, forming the analysis to the three-echelon competitive and cooperative model. Second, we divide the retailers into two types according to the methods of competition and cooperation then discuss each of them. We take the retailers as the major subject firms while considering the substitutive upstream firms and the differences of the price and quality offering by upstream firm, which then causing the problems that the retailers judge their order amount according to their cost. This research’s main purpose is from the retailers’ angle to build a game model and through referring to the verification of the data to discuss every pattern of the retailers in the competitive and cooperative game.

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