2020年4月證期會公布2019年第六屆的公司治理評鑑結果，但較後段級距的公司卻名列2019年「台灣高薪100指數」其中，而金管會於2020年發布修正「公開發行公司年報應行記載事項準則」，位於公司治理評鑑結果最後一級距的公司，應揭露前五位酬金最高主管之薪酬資訊，故本研究欲探討高階主管薪酬與公司治理評鑑排名之間的關聯性，以台灣上市櫃企業並排除金融業為研究標的，共4,453筆之研究樣本，研究期間為2017年至2019年，利用迴歸模型來進行實證分析。實證結果發現，高階主管薪酬與公司治理評鑑排名有正顯著關聯性。在前五級距評鑑排名之公司中，前三級距評鑑排名之公司，其高階主管薪酬之正向係數值優於第四及第五級距評鑑排名之公司，代表公司治理評鑑排名較前者，願意支付較高之薪酬來吸引高階主管人才。研究目的希冀藉由實證結果提供企業欲提升治理評鑑排名是否可藉由高薪招攬優秀高階主管改善公司治理文化之成效參考，亦在公司治理評鑑指標相關文獻有所補充。

In April 2020, the Securities and Futures Conference announced the results of the sixth corporate governance evaluation in 2019, but the companies in the final stage were listed in the 2019 "Taiwan High Salary 100 Index". In 2020, the FSC issued an amendment to the "Guidelines for Recording Matters in Annual Reports of Publicly Issuing Companies". Companies with the last level of corporate governance evaluation results should expose the top five highest paid executives. Therefore, this article intends to study the correlation between executive compensation and corporate governance evaluation rankings. A total of 4,453 research samples are based on Taiwan listed companies and the financial industry is excluded. The research period is from 2017 to 2019, using regression models. To conduct an empirical analysis. The empirical results found that there is a positive and significant correlation between executive compensation and the ranking of corporate governance evaluation. Among the companies ranked in the top five rankings, the companies ranked in the third rankings have a positive coefficient value of executive compensation better than the companies ranked in the fourth and fifth rankings, representing the corporate governance evaluation. Those who rank higher are willing to pay higher compensation to attract executives. The purpose of the research is to use empirical results to provide a reference for the effectiveness of whether companies want to improve their governance evaluation rankings by recruiting outstanding executives with high compensation to improve corporate governance culture, and to supplement the literature on corporate governance evaluation indicators.

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