摘要
在2008年，美國因為次級房貸風暴而產生之金融危機，金融監理之研究逐漸蔚為風潮。金融監理的最終目的不外乎是促進法規之服從，法學家、經濟學家則提出諸多理論與方法達到這個願景。傳統上金融監理被認為是公共機關的行政任務，但事實上私人訴訟以及私人的法規執行力量也會對於金融監理或公司治理產生莫大助益，而廣義金融上包含證券與保險領域，筆者欲探究證券訴訟良好運作時對於公共金融監理之任務可以達到如何的幫助。
筆者於論文中關注於證券法規之執行面向，而非傳統上之規範面與政策導向，並且在論文中分析公共執行者與私人執行者之良窳與兩者之間的交互作用。訴訟為法規執行的重要方式之一，美國為全世界上證券訴訟最為發達的國家，該國透過集團訴訟法制與相關配套措施，克服大規模紛爭本身帶有之集體行動困難，利用如同私人檢察長之證券律師，主動打擊證券不法，進而幫助整體金融秩序之維護。透過回顧與分析美國證券訴訟之發展脈絡與改革經驗，可以幫助後進國家證券訴訟法治之發展。
台灣於民國91年7月17日公布全文為41條之「證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法」，嗣後經過多次修正與多年發展，已確立台灣之證券訴訟由透過該法所設立之「投資人保護中心」所主導，有別於美國以律師主導證券訴訟為純粹之私人執行模式，台灣模式是本質為私人執行，卻帶有官方色彩與官方機構大量介入之特色。台灣雖然在證券實體法上大量參考美國之證券法，惟在法規之執行主體上產生法律移植之巨大質變。投資人保護法已經運作了10多年，是時候了，回顧與分析這10多年來投資人保護中心主導證券訴訟的成果，以及未來可能的改革方案。基於此脈絡，筆者將論文之架構拆解為以下六章:
第一章: 敘述研究動機、問題意識、研究方法與研究限制。
第二章: 分析投資人保護中心獨占台灣證券訴訟市場之獨占性地位成因與優缺點、以及證券訴訟的功能性，確立證券訴訟對於金融監理的助益乃在於透過私人執行證券法規，幫助、補充並提升公共執行證券法規的不足。
第三章: 回顧美國之證券訴訟，其興起、限縮與改革。並借助其改革經驗改善台灣證券訴訟的實際運作。
第四章: 分析台灣目前由投保中心獨占證券訴訟的階段性成果，並探討對於現階段可以如何做出調整。
第五章: 回顧台灣現行之法規、學者見解以及法院心證，大致上對於證券訴訟之態度，是否有利於投資人主張權利。並結合相關資料，檢討賦予投保中心獨占性地位是否合理，以及未來改革的可能性。
第六章: 最後一章為結論，筆者認為以非營利組織主導之模式可能仍會持續相當久的時間，美國以律師主導之模式難以在台灣生根，不過台灣現行模式仍需要諸多調整，將分為近期執法調整與遠期改革展望說明之。

關鍵字: 金融監理；公共執行；私人執行；證券集團訴訟；證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法；投資人保護中心；獨占性；競爭；損害填補；嚇阻不法

Advancing Financial Supervision by the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act—Focusing on the Securities Class Action by the Investors Protection Center

Author: Tseng, Wei-Che
Advisor: Chen, Chun-Jen, Ph.D.
National Cheng Kung University Department of Law

SUMMARY
This study presents an introduction and an explanation of Advancing Financial
Supervision by the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act.
This thesis begins by introducing and explaining the status, function, and significance of the securities litigation from the Investor Protection Center in Taiwan.
This paper also introduces the history of the securities class action in the United States, foreign scholars’ literatures, and judicial review standards in the U.S. Furthermore, it discusses the reform program in the U.S. and Taiwan. In the end, this study proposes suggestions and conclusion.

The conclusion of advancing financial supervision by the securities investor and futures trader protection act is affirmative, but it still has some disadvantages. The suggestion of this paper is that the Investor Protection Center should solve the inefficient problem as soon as possible: 1. It is necessary to adjust enforcement of law；2. The competent authority should add to more competition power in the securities litigation market.

Key Words: Financial Supervision, Public Implementation, Private Implementation, Securities Class Action, Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, Investor Protection Center, Monopoly, Competition, Compensation, Deterrence.

INTRODUCTION

The primary aim of financial supervision is to maintain financial stability and to protect the investors.
With the high-speed growth of financial business, securities markets not only provide the opportunity for enterprise to raise capital but also to give investor an alternative way to make money. Therefore, the protection of investors is the most important issue in the financial supervision.
The U.S.-style securities class action is considered the most powerful mechanism to enforce securities law. However, a lot of frivolous litigation may also jeopardize the stability of securities markets.
In Taiwan, the Congress passed the Securities and Future Investor Protection Act (SFIPA) in 2002, which symbolizes a new era for investor protection.

Compared to the U.S.-style securities class action as an enforcement mechanism, whether Taiwan’ Investor Protection Center can better play the leading role of conducting securities litigations. Furthermore, the Investor Protection Center as nonprofit organization (NPO), how can it strengthen corporate governance, compensate investors’ loss and deter wrongdoers through securities litigation.

This study starts from the introduction of securities litigation in Taiwan, and the analysis of the history of securities litigation in U.S. Compared to those in Taiwan, securities litigation in the U.S. have existed for several decades, and the U.S. have established a series of judicial review standards, scholars’ opinion, and reform program to promote market order. Furthermore, this thesis aims to analyze the development of the U.S. and current situation of Taiwan. In addition, this study discusses the possibility of the recent amendment of law enforcement and future institution reform. Finally, the contribution of this paper is advancing Taiwan’ domestic laws, completing the protection of securities investors, and strengthening stability of the financial market.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

There are many methods in this thesis include “the literature analysis method”, “the
Comparative research method”, “the case study method”, “inductive method”, “deductive method”. This study also analyzes domestic scholars’ literatures, foreign scholars’ literatures and investigation reports.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of advancing financial supervision by the securities investor and futures trader protection act in Taiwan is affirmative, nonetheless, some defect should be revised. The author believes that the model led by non-profit organizations may still continue for a long time.
Therefore, there are two suggestion of this study:

1. Recent amendment of law enforcement include right of investigation, litigation strategy, provisional attachment, etc. The competent authority should upgrade the efficiency of Investor Protection Center and the courts should do more judicial review in the securities litigation.

2. Future institution reform: It is important to build more competition of securities litigation market. If one takes an optimistic perspective on contemporary developments, Investor Protection Center seems likely to be held accountable by active competition. Ultimately, whether one likes it or not, competition is coming and efficiency is raising.

參考文獻

中文文獻

一、書籍

1. John Lanchester，大債時代—第一本看懂全球債務危機的書，林茂昌譯，初版，2011年，早安財經文化有限公司。
2. 王文宇等著，金融法，9版，2016年2月，元照。
3. 民事訴訟法研究基金會，民事訴訟法之研討(十八)，初版，2012年5月，元照。
4. 吳光明，證券交易法論，增訂10版，2011年1月，三民書局。
5. 沈冠伶，訴訟權保障與裁判外紛爭處理，初版，2006年4月，元照。
6. 易明秋，公司治理法制論，初版，2007年2月，五南。
7. 林國全，證券交易法研究，初版，2000年，元照。
8. 邱聯恭，程序制度機能論，初版，1996年8月，三民書局。
9. 姜世明，任意訴訟及部分程序爭議問題，初版，2009年3月，元照。
10. 陳春山，企業管控與投資人保護—金融改革之路，初版，2000年5月，元照。
11. 陳春山，證券交易法論，11版，2012年10月，五南。
12. 曾宛如，公司法制基礎理論之再建構，國立台灣大學法學叢書系列202，2版，2012年11月。
13. 黃茂榮，法學方法與現代民法，國立臺灣大學法學叢書(三二)，增訂六版，2011年9月。
14. 黃國昌，民事程序法學的理論與實踐，初版，2012年3月，元照。
15. 黃銘傑，公司治理與資本市場法制之落實與革新--邁向理論與實務融合之法制發展，初版，2011年12月，元照。
16. 廖大穎，證券市場與投資人保護之法理，初版，2011年9月，新學林。
17. 廖大穎，證券交易法導論，修訂4版，2009年8月，三民書局。
18. 劉連煜，內線交易構成要件，初版，2011年7月，元照。
19. 賴英照，股市遊戲規則—最新證券交易法解析，再版，2009年10月。
20. 謝易宏、黃鈵淳，證券求償之訴訟巧門—詐欺市場經典案例，初版，2006年9月，五南。

二、期刊

1. 王文宇，張冀明，非營利組織主導的證券團體訴訟—論投資人保護中心，月旦民商法雜誌，第15期，2007年3月。
2. 王志誠，直接或間接操縱市場行為之構成要件，台灣法學雜誌，238期，2013年12月。
3. 王志誠，相對成交行為之構成要件，月旦法學教室，第164期，2016年6月。
4. 王怡蘋，荷蘭大型損害事件集團和解(WCAM)制度，軍法專刊，第61卷第2期，2015年4月。
5. 吳光明，證券市場投資人保護立法評價體系之探討以團體訴訟文化為中心，存款保險資訊季刊，第24卷第3期，2011年9月。
6. 吳光明，證券投資損害民事訴權之探討，月旦法學雜誌，第155期，2008年4月。
7. 吳從周，簽證會計師責任之再檢討—從民法與民事訴訟法對應適用的觀點評臺灣板橋地方法院九八年度金字第三號判決，月旦裁判時報，第19期，2013年2月。
8. 呂太郎，假扣押之釋明，月旦法學雜誌，167期，2009年4月。
9. 沈冠伶，消費者團體訴訟之再建構:以擴散型損害及集團權利為中心，臺大法學論叢，第44卷特刊，2015年11月。
10. 周振鋒，論證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法第十條之一，以股東代表訴訟為中心，法學新論，第27期，2010年10月。
11. 林仁光，西風東漸—談內線交易Civil Penalty制度之發展，月旦法學雜誌，第231期，2014年8月。
12. 林志潔，內線交易「實際知悉」要件之舉證與心證門檻—從綠點案談起，月旦法學雜誌，第222期，2013年11月。
13. 林志潔、林孝倫，從力霸案論臺灣會計師簽證財報不實之法律責任：一個實證的分析，臺大法學論叢，第39卷第3期，2010年9月。
14. 林郁馨，投資人的諾亞方舟：投資人保護中心與證券團體訴訟之實證研究，月旦法學雜誌，第229期，2014年。
15. 林郁馨，從美國證券集體訴訟談證券詐欺訴訟的填補損害及嚇阻功能，月旦財經法雜誌，第14期，2008年9月。
16. 林國全，財報不實之民事責任，月旦民商法雜誌，第48期，2015年6月。
17. 林國全，操縱行為案例分析，證券暨期貨月刊，22卷12期，2004年12月。
18. 林麗香，內線交易之消息重大性/臺高院101重金上更(二)3刑事判決，台灣法學雜誌，251期，2014年7月。
19. 邵慶平，投保中心代表訴訟的公益性:檢視、強化與反省，臺大法學論叢，第44卷第1期，2015年3月。
20. 邵慶平，金融管制與私人執行－－國際金融危機後管制發展的反省，國立中正大學法學集刊，40期，2013年7月。
21. 邵慶平，證券交易法的法律變更與續造—最高法院一0二年度台上字第73號民事判決評析，月旦裁判時報，第26期，2014年4月。
22. 邵慶平，證券交易法第20條第1項之民事責任主體不及於次要行為人？： 以企業財報不實類型案例為中心，臺大法學論叢，第42卷第1期，2013年。
23. 邵慶平，證券訴訟上「交易因果關係」與「損害因果關係」之認定：評高雄地院九一年重訴字第四四七號判決，台灣本土法學雜誌，第79 期，2006年2月。
24. 邵慶平，證券團體訴訟中因果關係構成要件的比較研究—兼論投保中心制度的改革方向，臺北大學法學論叢，第99期，105年2月。
25. 洪令家，從美國法規範看我國證券集團訴訟和解制度之不足，台灣法學雜誌，第290期，2016年2月。
26. 殷若瑛，證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法之發展及演變，證券暨期貨月刊，第29卷第12期，2011年12月。
27. 張元、陳虹羽，董監事責任險與公司信用評分，兩岸金融季刊，第3卷第2期，2015年9月。
28. 張心悌，從美國最高法院Dura案思考證券詐欺之損失因果關係，月旦法學雜誌，第155期，2008年4月。
29. 張心悌，證券詐欺之因果關係與損害賠償─板橋地方法院九六年金字二號民事判決評釋─，台灣本土法學雜誌，第101期，2007年12月。
30. 張心悌、朱德芳，商業法庭於美國發展現況與趨勢之研究，月旦法學雜誌，第177期，2010年2月。
31. 張瑞杰，投保中心踐行股東行動主義成效，證券暨期貨月刊，第34卷第1期，105年1月。
32. 張冀明、闕光威、林靖揚，淺論「證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法」的保護主體與保護機構的調查權，律師雜誌，第285期，2003年6月。
33. 章武生、馮亞景，中國大陸證券團體損害賠償訴訟制度之建構－－以臺灣證券團體訴訟制度為借鏡，月旦民商法雜誌，第49期，2015年9月。
34. 莊永丞，由美國Dura v. Broudo案反思證券投資人之損害因果關係，東吳法律學報，第22卷第4期，100年1月。
35. 莊永丞，證券交易法第二十條證券詐欺損害估算方法之省思，臺大法學論叢第34卷第2期，2005年3月。
36. 郭大維，我國證券詐欺訴訟「因果關係」舉證之探討─以美國法為借鏡，月旦法學教室，第28期，2005年2月。
37. 郭大維，證券交易法第一百五十五條沖洗買賣之認定，月旦裁判時報，第30期，2014年12月。
38. 陳俊仁，主觀要件之「推定」與「視為」—內線交易「知悉說」與「利用說」之思辯，月旦法學教室，第157期，2015年11月。
39. 陳俊仁，論Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo：美國證券詐欺因果關係要件之再建構與對我國證券交易法制之啟示，歐美研究，第39卷4期，2009年12月。
40. 曾宛如，內線交易重大消息明確時點之認定:綠點案之啟示，月旦法學教室，第165期，2016年7月。
41. 曾宛如，有關證券投資人保護之未來發展，月旦財經法雜誌，第2期，2005年9月。
42. 曾宛如，我國代位訴訟之實際功能與未來發展:思考上的盲點，台灣法學雜誌，第159期，2010年9月。
43. 曾宛如，論證券交易法第二十條之民事責任─以主觀要件與信賴為核心，國立臺灣大學法學論叢，第33卷5期，2004年9月。
44. 湯欣，證券集團訴訟的替代性機制—比較法角度的初步考察，月旦民商法，第26期，2009年12月。
45. 廖大穎，人為操縱市場爭議與鑑識會計的訴訟支援—論意圖提高或壓低市場交易價格等的構成要件，月旦法學雜誌，第202期，2012年3月。
46. 廖大穎，論不實企業資訊與損害賠償之因果關係的舉證責任分配—兼評台北地方法院八十七年度重訴字第一三四七號民事判決的認定基礎評述「詐欺市場理論」在實務上的適用，月旦法學雜誌，第153期，2008年2月。
47. 廖大穎，論操縱市場與證券交易法第155條第1項第3、4款的構成要件—觀察臺中地院103年度金重訴字第1552號刑事判決，月旦裁判時報，第48期，2016年6月。
48. 廖大穎，論證券投資人保護機構之股東代表訴訟新制，月旦民商法雜誌，第32期，2011年6月。
49. 廖秀梅、湯麗芬、李建然，董監事暨重要職員責任保險與盈餘穩健性，會計評論，第63期，2016年7月。
50. 劉連煜，財報不實案件中之比例賠償責任與全部賠償責任，月旦法學教室，第134期，2013年12月。
51. 劉連煜，財報不實損害賠償之真實價格如何認定及投資人是否與有過失問題—最高法院一0二年度台上字第1294號民事判決研究，月旦法學雜誌，第232期，2014年9月。
52. 鄭子俊，證券訴訟之治理，法學新論，第31期，2011年8月。
53. 賴英照，內線交易的紅線－重大消息何時明確？中原財經法學，第36期，2016年6月。
54. 賴英照，知悉消息或利用消息的論辯，國立中正大學法學集刊，第53期，2016年10月。
55. 戴銘昇，最高法院對證券市場操縱行為刑事構成要件之認定，華岡法粹，52期，2012年3月。
56. 戴銘昇，證券市場操縱行為損害賠償之因果關係與舉證責任—最高法院九十九年度台上字第二二四四號民事判決之評析，月旦法學雜誌，第193期，2011年6月。

三、學位論文

莊嘉蕙，內線交易之實證研究，國立交通大學管理學院碩士在職專班科技法律組碩士論文，2009 年 7 月。

四、論文集

1. 沈冠伶，從「德國投資人示範訴訟」之新制再論「追加選定當事人」制度，收錄於:邁入二十一世紀之民事法學研究──駱永家教授七秩華誕祝壽論文集，2006年7月，元照。
2. 林文里，資訊公開不實所致損害金額的計算方法，收錄於:現代公司法制之新課題—賴英照大法官六秩華誕祝賀論文集，2005年8月，元照。
3. 姜炳俊，德國投資人示範訴訟新制，收錄於:邁入二十一世紀之民事法學研究──駱永家教授七秩華誕祝壽論文集，2006年7月，元照。

五、網路資料

力霸金融弊案對會計師即有作假帳之指控: http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20070122/3199229/ . 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

台積電持股內容 http://easyfun.concords.com.tw/z/zc/zck/zck_2330.djhtm. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1。

法源網站資料庫 http://fyjud.lawbank.com.tw/index.aspx. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1。

投保中心網站 http://www.sfipc.org.tw/MainWeb/Index.aspx?L=1. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1。

財團法人保險事業發展中心網站
http://www.tii.org.tw/opencms/research/research06/000016.html. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1。

臺灣資本市場概況—臺灣證券交易所 http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/investor/foreign_invest/TCMI_CH_1501.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1。

五、其他資料

證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法草案總說明，立法院第5屆第1會期第11次會議議案關係文書。

外文文獻

一、英文書籍

1. Ayres, Ian & Braithwaite, John, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE, Oxford University Press (1992).
2. Coffee, John C. jr., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE, Harvard University Press (2015).
3. Coffee, John C. Jr., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Oxford University Press (2006).
4. Holmes, Oliver Wendell Jr., THE COMMON LAW, University of Toronto Law School Typographical Society (2011). Edited by Pereira Paulo J. S. & Beltran Diego M..
5. Klonoff, Robert H., CLASS ACTION AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION, THOMSON/WEST (3rd, 2007).
6. Redish, Martin H., WHOLESALE JUSTICE : CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT, Standford University Press (2009).
7. Riles, Annelise, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE : LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, University of Chicago Press (2011).
8. Salamon, Lester M., PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE : GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE, Johns Hopkins University Press (1995).
9. Taylor, Michael, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION, Cambridge University Press (1987).

二、英文期刊

1. Aitken, Lee, Before the High Court. 'Litigation Lending' after Fostif: An Advance in. Consumer Protection, or a Licence to 'Bottomfeeders'? 28 Sydney L. Rev. 171 (2006).
2. Alexander, Janet Cooper, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347 (1998).
3. Alexander, Janet Cooper, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
4. Alexander, Janet Cooper, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1996).
5. Alexander, Janet Cooper, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421 (1994).
6. Allen, Robert, Securities Litigation as A Coordination Problem, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 475 (2009).
7. Bai, Lynn, Cox, James D. & Thomas, Randall S., Lying and Getting Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1877 (2010).
8. Baker, Lynn A., Perino, Michael A. & Silver, Charles, Is The Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (2015).
9. Baker, Tom & Griffith, Sean J., How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (2009).
10. Baker, Tom & Griffith, Sean J., Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors & Officers Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007).
11. Baker, Tom & Griffith, Sean J., The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors & Officers Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007).
12. Baldwin, Robert, Why Rules Don’t Work, 53 MODERN L. REV. 321 (1990).
13. Black, Barbara, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions under The Radar, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802 (2009).
14. Black, Barbara, Should The Sec Be A Collection Agency For Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317 (2008).
15. Black, Bernard, Cheffins Brian & Klausner Michael, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006).
16. Bohn, James & Choi, Stephen J., Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996).
17. Bondi, Bradley J., An Economy In Crisis: Law, Policy, And Morality During The Recession: Article: I. Suggestions For Regulatory Reform: Facilitating Economic Recovery And Sustainable Growth Through Reform Of The Securities Class-Action System: Exploring Arbitration As An Alternative To Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 607 (2010).
18. Bronsteen, John, Class Action Settlements: an Opt-in Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903 (2005).
19. Burch, Elizabeth Chamblee, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348 (2007).
20. Cain, Daylian M., Loewenstein, George & Moore Don, A., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005).
21. Cheng, C.S. Agnes, Huang, Henry He, Lobo Gerald J. & Li Yinghua, Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. Fin. Econ. 356 (2010).
22. Choi, Stephen J. & Pritchard, A. C., SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2016).
23. Choi, Stephen J. & Thompson, Robert B., Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489 (2006).
24. Clark, Stuart & Harris, Christina, The Push to Reform Class Action Procedure in Australia: Evolution or Revolution? 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 775 (2008).
25. Clopton, Zachary D., Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 285 (2016).
26. Coates, John C., IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531 (2001).
27. Coffee, John C. Jr., Accountability and Competition In Securities Class Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407 (2008).
28. Coffee, John C. Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533 (2005).
29. Coffee, John C. Jr., Law and the Market: Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007).
30. Coffee, John C. Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288 (2010).
31. Coffee, John C. Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006).
32. Coffee, John C. Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why The Model of The Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983).
33. Coffee, John C. Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
34. Cooter, Robert, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
35. Cox, James D. & Thomas, Randall S., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006).
36. Cox, James D. & Thomas, Randall S., Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implication of The Failure of Financial of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005).
37. Cox, James D. & Thomas, Randall S., With the Assistance of Kiku Dana, Sec Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737 (2003).
38. Cox, James D., Making Securities Fraud Class Action Virtous, 39 ARIZ.L.REV. 497 (1997).
39. Cox, James D., The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999).
40. Cox, James D., Thomas, Randall S. & Bai., Lynn, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355 (2008).
41. Easterbrook, Frank H. & Fischel, Daniel R., Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985).
42. Eisenberg, Theodore & Miller, Geoffrey P., Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004).
43. Engstrom, David Freeman, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013).
44. Engstrom, David Freeman, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913 (2014).
45. Engstrom, David Freeman, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of Doj Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation under The False Claims Act, 107 NW. U.L. REV. 1689 (2013).
46. Erickson, Jessica M., The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 65 FLORIDA L. REV. 1089 (2013).
47. Fisch, Jill E., Confronting The Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333 (2009).
48. Fisch, Jill E., Teaching Corporate Governance through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745 (2000).
49. Fox, Merritt B., Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 BUS. LAW. 507 (2005).
50. Fox, Merritt B., Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations when Issuers do not Trade? 2009 WISC. L. REV. 297 (2009).
51. Gande, Amar & Lewis, Craig M., Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers, 44 J.FIN.&QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. 823 (2009).
52. Gilles, Myriam & Friedman, Gary B., Exploding The Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006).
53. Glover, J. Maria, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
54. Gold, Andrew S., Experimenting with the Lead Plaintiff Selection Process in Securities Class Actions: A Suggestion for PSLRA Reform, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 447 (2008).
55. Goshen, Zohar & Parchomovsky, Gideon, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006).
56. Grace, Stefano M., Strengthening Investor Confidence In Europe: U.S.­Style Securities Class Actions and The Ac­ Quis Communautaire, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 281 (2006).
57. Griffith, Sean J., Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (2006).
58. Groff, Lynndon, Is Too Big To Fail Too Big To Confess? Scrutinizing The Sec No-Admit Consent Judgment Proposals, 54 B.C.L. REV. 1727 (2013).
59. Hamdani, Assaf, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003).
60. Hansmann, Henry B., The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
61. Helland, Eric, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J. LAW & ECON. 365 (2006).
62. Hensler Deborah R., The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 7 (2009).
63. Hensler, Deborah R., Goldilocks and The Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2012).
64. Hensler, Deborah R., The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (2011).
65. Isaacson, Eric Alan, The Class Action after a Decade of Roberts Court Decisions The Roberts Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles, 48 AKRON L. REV. 923 (2015).
66. Issacharoff, Samuel, Regulating after the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375 (2007).
67. Jackson, Howell E. & Gkantinis Stavros, Markets as Regulators, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (2007).
68. Jackson, Howell E., Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007).
69. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
70. Joo, Thomas W., Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, (1999).
71. Karpoff, Jonathan H., Lee, D. Scott & Martin, Gerald S., The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FN.ECON. 193 (2008).
72. Karpoff, Jonathan H., Lee, D. Scott & Martin, Gerald S., The Cost to firms of Cooking the Books, 43 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. 581 (2008).
73. Karsten, Peter, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998).
74. Klock, Mark, Do Class Action Filings Affect Stock Prices? The Stock Market Reaction to Securities Class Actions Post PSLRA, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 109 (2015).
75. Klock, Mark, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 437 (2011).
76. Koch, Harald, Non-Class Group Litigation under Eu and German Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 355 (2001).
77. Korsmo, Charles R., Market Efficiency and Fraud on The Market: The Danger Of Halliburton, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827 (2014).
78. Koslow, Jon, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811 (1991).
79. Kraakma, Reinier H., Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
80. Langevoort, Donald C., Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639 (1996).
81. Langevoort, Donald C., Judgment Day for Fraud-On-Themarket: Reflections on Amgen and The Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (2015).
82. Langevoort, Donald C., Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third-Party Liability under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125 (2010).
83. Langevoort, Donald C., The Continuing Evolution of Securities Class Actions Symposium: Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on The Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151 (2009).
84. Langevoort, Donald C., The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices about Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591 (2006).
85. Lemos, Margaret H. & Minzner Max, for-profit public enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014).
86. Lemos, Margaret H., aggregate litigation goes public: representative suits by state attorney generals, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 486 (2012).
87. Lemos, Margaret H., Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515 (2016).
88. Lin, Andrew Jen-Guang, The Challenges and Contemporary Issues of Taiwan's Investor Protection System: A Model to Learn or to Avoid, 11 NATIONAL TAIWAN U. L. REV. 129 (2016).
89. Lin, Yu-Hsin, Modeling Securities Class Actions Outside the United States: The Role of Nonprofits in the Case of Taiwan, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 143 (2007).
90. Macey, Jonathan R., The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 639 (2010).
91. Madderra, Michael J., The New Class Actions in Japan, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 795 (2014).
92. Marcus, Richard, Bomb Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic Values—A New Path to Procedural Harmonization? 107 NW. L. REV. 475 (2013).
93. Martin, Susan Lorde, Litigation Financing:Another Subprime Industry that Has a place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83 (2008).
94. McGovernt, Francis E., Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986).
95. Mctier, Brian Carson & Wald, John K., The Causes And Consequences Of Securities Class Litigation, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 649 (2011).
96. Milhaupt, Curtis J., Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection: Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 169 (2004).
97. Mitchell, Lawrence E., The innocent Shareholder: An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 243 (2009).
98. Murphy, Bernard & Cameron Camille, Access To Justice And The Evolution Of Class Action Litigation In Australia, 30 MELBOURNE U. L.R. 399 (2006).
99. Park, James J., Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115 (2012).
100. Perino, Michael A., Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work? 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913 (2005).
101. Perino, Michael A., Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273 (1998).
102. Perino, Michael, Institutional Activism through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368 (2012).
103. Porta, Rafael La, Florencio Lopez–de–Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws? 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006).
104. Ramirez, Steven A., The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2014).
105. Redish, Martin H., private contingent fee lawyers and public power:constitutional and political implications, 18 S.CT. ECON. REV. 77 (2010).
106. Rose, Amanda M., Better Bounty Hunting: How The Sec’s New Whistleblower Program Changes The Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 1235 (2014).
107. Rose, Amanda M., Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008).
108. Rose, Amanda M., The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010).
109. Rowe, Thomas D. Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982).
110. Russell, Tiana Leia, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 141 (2010).
111. Scholz, John T., Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115 (1991).
112. Schulz, David B., Indemnification of Directors and Officers Against Liabilities Imposed under Federal Securities Laws, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 1043 (1995).
113. Scott, Hals. & Silverman, Leslie N., Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 1187 (2013).
114. Shao, Ching-Ping, Representative Litigations in Corporate and Securities Laws by Government-Sanctioned Nonprofit Organizations: Lessons from Taiwan, 15 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 58 (2013).
115. Shavell, Steven, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 166 (2000).
116. Shavell, Steven, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
117. Shea, Brian J., Note: Better Go It Alone: An Extension of Fiduciary Duties for Investment Fund Managers in Securities Class Action Opt-Outs, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 255 (2015).
118. Shen, Kuan-Ling, Class Action in Taiwan: A New System Created Using the Theory of “Right of Procedure Options”, 5 NATIONAL TAIWAN U. L. REV. 39 (2010).
119. Silver, Charles, We're Scared To Death": Class Certification And Blackmail, 78 NW. U.L. REV. 1357 (2003).
120. Starykh, Svetlana & Boettrich, Stefan, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2015 Full-Year Review Record Number of Cases Being Filed Faster than Ever with the Shortest Alleged Class Periods, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (25 January 2016).
121. Steinitzt, Maya, Whose Claim is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011).
122. Stephenson, Matthew C., Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93 (2005).
123. Velikonja, Urska, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the Sec’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331 (2015).
124. Veljanovski, Cento, Third Party Litigation Funding in Europe, 8 J.L., ECO., & POLY. 405 (2012).
125. Wang, Wallace Wen-Yeu & Chen, Jianlin, Reforming China’s Securities Civil Actions: Lessons from US’s PSLRA Reform and Taiwan’s Government Sanctioned Non-profit Organization, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 115 (2008).
126. Warren, Manning Gilbert III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class Action: An Unlikely Export to the European Union, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2012).
127. Watson, Garry D., Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269 (2001).
128. Webber, David H., The Plight of The Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 157 (2012).
129. Weisst, Elliott J. & Becke John S., Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995).
130. Wilkins, David B., Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of “Substitute” Attorneys General, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 423 (2010).
131. Winship, Verity, Fair Funds and the SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLORIDA L. REV. 1103 (2008).

三、英文判決

Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. May 8, 2014).
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
Boilermakers Local154 v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.2d 934 (Del.Ch.2013).
Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Limited [2006] HCA 41.
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
Clairs Keeley (A Firm) v Treacy & Ors [2003] WASCA 299.
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
Dura Pharmaceuticals. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
Findon v. Parker, 152 Eng. Rep. 976 (Ex. 1843).
Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1970).
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398 (2014).
In Re Warner Communications Securities Litigation., 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
J. I Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
Kinder v. Nixon, 2000 wl 684860 (mo. Ct.app. may 30, 2000).
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.1981).
Stanta Clara v. Superior Court, 74 cal. Rptr. 3d 842 (ct.app. 2008).
State v. Hagerty, 580 N.W.2d 139 (n.d.1998).
State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428 (r.i.2008).
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 328 (S.D.N.Y.2011).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).

四、網路資料

Baumfield, Victoria S., Corporate Class Actions - A Primer, Bond University, ePublications@bond (2009) available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=cgej. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Bogart, W.A., Kalajdzic, Jasminka & Matthews, Ian, Class Actions in Canada: A National Procedure in a Multi-Jurisdictional Society? A report prepared for The Globalization of Class Actions Conference, Oxford University (December 2007). available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Canada_National_Report.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Coffee, John C. Jr., SEC enforcement: What has gone wrong? National Law Journal, (December 3, 2012) available at http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/02/sec-enforcement-what-has-gone-wrong/. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Check, Darren J., Amjed, Naumon A. & Degnan, Ryan T., Recent Trends and Developments in Securities Litigation (2016). available at https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/trends-in-shareholder-litigation-ktmc.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Choi, Stephen J., Pritchard, Adam C. & Wiechman, Anat C., Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations, U of Michigan Law & Econ, Empirical Legal Studies Center Paper No. 11-009, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-20 (2013). available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1876725. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Choi, Stephen J., The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 528145 (2004). available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=528145. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Dayen, David, The Sec Nails a Minnow While the Whales Go Free: Why Wasn’T Goldman Sachs on Trial Alongside Fabrice Tourre? New Republic, Aug.6, 2013 available at https://newrepublic.com/article/114188/fabrice-tourre-goldman-sachs-trial-sec-nails-minnow. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Editorial, Professor Coffee Hits A Nerve At Sec, Corporate Crime Reporter., January. 15, 2013, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/coffeehitsanerveatsec01152013/. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Frank, Marvin L & Brooks, Brian D, Securities Class Actions: Improving Corporate Governance Through Accountability, Securities Law Newsletter (2010). available at https://www.frankllp.com/files/securities-class-actions-improving-corporate-governance-through-accountability.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Henning, Joel F., Law Firms and Legal Departments: Can’t We All Get Along? From The Outside, Looking In, Business. Law. Today, July/Aug. 1998, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/1998/07/from-the-outside-199807.authcheckdam.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Henning, Peter S., Sec Losing Streak in Court Puts Agency in Spotlight, N.Y. Times, Feb.10, 2014. available at https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/s-e-c-s-losing-streak-in-court-puts-agency-in-spotlight/?_r=0. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Jennings, Jared, Kedia, Simi & Rajgopa, Shivaram, The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and Class Action Litigation, (2011) Electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868578. 最後瀏覽日 2017/5/1.

Jackson, Howell E. & Roe Mark, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: ResourceBased Evidence, Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Paper No. 0-28 (Mar. 16, 2009). available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Khuzami, Robert S. & Canellos, George S., Unfair Claims, Untenable Solution: Professor John Coffee does not do The Secs Enforcement Record Justice, The National Law Journal., January. 14, 2013 available at http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202584164134?id=1202584164134&slreturn=20130015155657. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Liptak, Adam, Gap Seen Between Court-Appointed Lawyers and Public Defenders, N.Y. Times, July 13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/us/13cnd-defenders.html. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Long, Cate & Khuzami, Robert: Master Distracter, Reuters, January 17, 2013, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2013/01/17/robert-khuzami-master-distracter/. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

LaCroix, Kevin, Japanese Securities Litigation Trends: 2000-2012, The D&O Diary (2013) available at http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/07/articles/securities-litigation/japanese-securities-litigation-trends-2000-2012/. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

MacMaster, James H. & Branch, Ward K., Financing Class Actions, (june 2002) available at http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/299713/3665777/1248395358330/classactions_financing.pdf?token=9cuhSfJgxeyGTjG4MdDZBhTua5U%3D. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Milberg, Weiss律師事務所之相關報導available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/18/us/18cnd-legal.html. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Morvillo & Abramowitz, Sec Enforcement Data Analyses: Analysis Of Cases Filed Between January 1, 2013 And September 30, 2013, available at https://www.maglaw.com/events/speaking-engagements/2013-10-24-lawrence-bader-speaks-at-nacdls-9th-annual-conference-defending-the-white-collar-case/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/MAGIA%20SEC%20Report.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Maciejewski, Mariusz, Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in EU Member States (2011) available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT24242EN.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Marcus, David & Gilly, Sara, The Changing Nature of Sec Enforcement Actions, Cornerstone Research, available at https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Articles/The-Changing-Nature-Of-SEC-Enforcement-Actions. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Pan, Eric J., Understanding Financial Regulation, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 329, April 2011. available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805018. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Rozen, Amir, Schaeffer, Joshua B. & Harris, Christopher, Opt-Out Cases in Securities Class Action Settlements, Cornerstone Research (2013) available at https://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/7cf8bd53-9e0b-45be-b4b3-3d810dfe2be3/Opt-Out-Cases-in-Securities-Class-Action-Settlemen.aspx. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Rakoff, Jed S., The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executive Been Prosecuted? New York Rev. Of Book, Jan.9, 2014 available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Song, Ok-Rial, Improving Corporate Governance Through Litigations: Derivative Suits and Class Actions in Korea, available at http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/coelaw/download/Ok-Rial%20Song.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

SCAC | Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/charts.html. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

Sale, Hillary A. & Thompson, Robert B., "Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions", Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (2015). available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1526. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

更多IMF相關資訊 http://www.imf.com.au/. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

更多的PSPD : available at http://www.peoplepower21.org/English. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

(消費者の財産的被害の集団的な回復のための民事の裁判手続の特例に関する法律について) [FOR THE ACT ON SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF CIVIL COURT PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTIVE RECOVERY OF PROPERTY DAMAGE OF CONSUMERS], available at http://www.caa.go.jp/planning/pdf/1304190_131213.pdf. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

美國前10大和解案件available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/top-ten.html. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.

美國模範公司法(Model Business Corporation Act)第7.40條available at http://www.unc.edu/~jfcoyle/MBCA/chapter7.htm. 最後瀏覽日2017/5/1.