本研究旨在探討擁有較強公司治理的公司相較於較弱公司治理的公司是否能獲得較佳的信用評等。我以2017-2018年的台灣上市公司為觀察對象，共5,086筆觀察值，研究公司治理與企業信用評等之間的關聯性。與過去的文獻相符，有較強監督或較佳公司治理的公司將會獲得較佳的信用評等，我的實證結果發現企業信用評等與機構投資人持股比例、審計委員會規模、董監具有財務相關經歷人數、獨立董事平均兼任家數、董事會規模為正相關，相反地，與有金字塔結構、交叉持股情形、董監質押股票比例、CEO兼任董事長情形為負相關。本研究結果在考量內生性或忽略重要變數問題後仍具穩健性。

This study aims to investigate whether companies with strong corporate governance receive better credit ratings than companies with weak corporate governance. I use a sample of 5,086 Taiwanese firms over the 2017-2018 period to examine the relationship between corporate governance variables and credit ratings. Consistent with the hypothesis that stronger monitoring or better governance improves credit ratings, I find that the credit ratings are positively related to institutional ownership, audit committee size, directors’ and supervisors’ expertise, independent directors’ expertise, and board size. As expected, credit ratings are negatively related to pyramid structure, cross-shareholding structure, pledged shares ratio of directors and supervisors, and CEO power. My results are robust to controlling for endeogeneity problem or omitted variable bias.

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