機場問題探討的是多家航空公司共建一條跑道的成本分配問題。本文的目的是對機場問題的核心解提出非合作刻畫。我們設計了兩個模型。模型一能夠解釋不包含邊界點的核心解。在模型二中，我們證明核心解是其唯一的納什均衡結果。

SUMMARY
The airport problem considers how to allocate the cost of an airstrip among several airlines that use the airstrip in common. The core is one of solution concepts for airport problems. Each allocation in the core is stable. That is, it cannot be improved by any subcoalition of airlines. The aim of this paper is to propose two non-cooperative foundations of the core for airport problems. We can design non-cooperative games for airlines in which they divide the costs of building runways. If the game rules are reasonable, the agents would participate the games. When the set of equilibrium outcomes of the game coincides with the core, we can confirm that the core can be interpreted strategically. We provide two models in this paper. The first model supports the core without boundary. We show the set of all Nash equilibrium outcomes of model 2 coincides with the core.

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