| 研究生: |
李晨瑀 Li, Chen-Yu |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
考量供應商具資金限制下之供應鏈金融 A Study on the Supply Chain Finance under the Supplier's Capital Constraints |
| 指導教授: |
吳政翰
Wu, Cheng-Han |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 工業與資訊管理學系 Department of Industrial and Information Management |
| 論文出版年: | 2023 |
| 畢業學年度: | 111 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 79 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 採購訂單融資 、信用擔保 、資訊不對稱 、資訊共享 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | purchase order finance, credit guarantee, information asymmetry, information sharing |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:53 下載:0 |
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最近幾年,關於中小型企業的融資議題十分熱門,眾所周知,中小型企業具有
資本小、高度仰賴現金流的特色,尤其在臺灣中小型企業占比非常龐大,對於資金融通的需求更加迫切。雖然已有多元的融資方案被提出,但關於銀行的決策角色卻沒有過多的著墨。因此,本研究建立一個由資金受限的供應商、下游大型製造商、第三方銀行組成的供應鏈金融。考慮兩種製造商與銀行間之資訊狀態:資訊共享、資訊不對等,以及兩種融資方案:採購訂單融資、買方擔保融資,分別對不同穩定度類型的供應商進行研究,希望能觀察出銀行處於不同資訊狀態時,供應鏈成員的決策將如何受到不穩定供應商的生產成功機率影響,同時也討論資訊於兩融資方案間之相對意義,最後根據研究結果進一步對供應鏈成員提出管理意涵。本研究發現,當製造商與銀行存在資訊不對等時,高穩定度類型的供應商在資訊可靠度高時對於採購訂單融資的偏好程度將隨著生產成功率的提升而增加;低穩定度類型的供應商則在資訊可靠度越低時越偏好採購訂單融資,並在特定條件下更青睞買方擔保融資。此外,當製造商願意為資金受限的供應商提供信用擔保時,可維持高水準訂購量且採購成本與還款成本將大幅下降,然而供應商並不會總是選擇買方擔保融資,有時反而選擇採購訂單融資更加有利。本研究亦發現,銀行對供應商的生產資訊瞭解程度越準確並非總是有利的,當 SME 供應商屬於低穩定度類型,資訊共享將會損害三方獲利。最後研究結果顯示,多數情況下供應鏈在各成員皆有共識偏好買方擔保融資時能實現最大化效益形成雙贏的局面。
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) often have limited access to capital and heavily rely on cash flow. Although several financing schemes have been proposed, the role of banks in decision-making has not been extensively studied. This study establishes a supply chain finance system with a capital-constrained supplier, a large downstream manufacturer, and a third-party bank. Two types of information status between the manufacturer and the bank are considered: information sharing and information asymmetry, along with two financing schemes: purchase order financing (POF) and buyer-backed purchase order financing (BPOF). The study aims to examine the impact of an unstable supplier's success rate on supply chain decisions under different information statuses and to discuss the relative importance of information between financing schemes. This study suggests that in the presence of information asymmetry between the manufacturer and the bank, the supplier of high stability type shows an increasing preference for POF as the reliability of information improves with a higher production success rate. Conversely, the supplier of low stability types exhibits a contrasting outcome, showing a greater preference for BPOF under specific conditions. In addition, when the manufacturer is willing to offer credit guarantees, it can sustain high levels of order quantity and lead to substantial reductions in procurement costs and repayment costs. However, the supplier sometimes opts for POF, which is more advantageous. Furthermore, a more accurate understanding of production information by the bank may not always be beneficial. When the supplier belongs to the low stability type, the sharing of information will reduce the profitability of all three parties involved. Ultimately, the study indicates that, in most cases, consensus preference for BPOF is necessary for maximum efficiency and a win-win situation in the supply chain.
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校內:2028-06-16公開