本文以公司理財中相當重要的兩個領域─新股上市與企業併購為討論對象。

本文的第一部份，探討新股上市最適的承銷契約；新股上市的承銷價格如何公平且合理的訂定，一直是股票市場中一個相當重要的課題。本研究嘗試以契約理論中的逆選擇模型，建立一個最適的承銷契約機制
。並透過契約的關係人：新股上市公司、承銷商及參與認購投資人三種不同的角色，探討公開發行公司股票上市承銷時，由於訊息不對稱所可能造成之無謂的損失及對整體社會福利的影響。此外，本研究並嘗試討論在此最適的契約條件之下，所可能產生的各種現象。

本文的第二部份，針對企業併購進行討論，討論的範圍有單一主併公司與多個主併公司的各種狀況。研究結果發現，預先持股(Toehold)愈多與愈看好併購綜效的公司，會提出較高的收購價格，進而提高其收購成功之機率。此外，經由主併公司的評估，大致上在其併購成功後，仍擁有可觀的期望報酬。

本文的第三部份，針對過去發生的國內併購事件進行實證研究，發現短期而言，主併公司股價具有正的累積異常報酬，在長期則有負的累積異常報酬，特別是非電子業的公司；而各併購事件發生年度整體股市的表現，與主併公司股價是否具有累積異常報酬，則並無顯著的關係。若以股東權益報酬率的提升效果作為觀察指標，則是以非電子業的主併公司表現相對較好。

This dissertation investigates two important issues in corporate finance, namely IPOs and Takeovers.

In the first part of this dissertation, I discuss the optimal underwriting contract since how to conclude a fair and reasonable underwriting price of initial public offering stocks has always been a very important issue in the stock market. This dissertation tries to quote the adverse selection model to establish an optimal underwriting mechanism. Besides, I investigate the deadweight loss due to asymmetric information and its effect on social welfare caused by the underwriting contract via the three-tier (The issuer/ The underwriters/ The retail investors) hierarchical model of contract theory. Finally, I try to examine the various phenomena resulted from the optimal contract.

The second part of this dissertation focuses on the issue of single-bidder and multi-bidder contest. From this part, I find that the bidders with larger toehold size or higher valuation of the takeover synergy will bid high, and therefore increase the probability of takeover success. Moreover, according to the evaluation of the acquirers, expected return remains high if the takeover succeeds.

As to the third part of this dissertation, I analyze the data collected from domestic mergers to obtain the following findings:
1. Acquirers have positive cumulative abnormal return in the short run, but negative cumulative abnormal return in the long run, especially for the non-electronic companies.
2. Whether the acquirers have cumulative abnormal returns is irrelevant to the return of market portfolio.
3. Analysis of the effect of raised return on equity shows that the non-electronic acquirers outperform the electronic acquirers.

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