我們研究雙重股權公司的公司價值及配息政策等。透過研究2009 年至2019 年的雙重股權公司可以發現，雙重股權公司在近年來會具備較高的公司價值，同時也具備較高的資金成本，並給予股東較高的報酬，上述因素隨著超額控制權的增加而相對增加。此外，雙重股權結構並不代表絕對穩定的經營權，少數樣本顯示，雙重股權公司是會被併購而成為其他公司之子公司。

We examine the firm value and payout policy of dual-class companies. The study of dual-class companies from 2009 to 2019 shows that dual-class companies have higher firm value, higher cost of capital, and higher shareholder compensation in recent years, and these factors increase with the increase in excess control rights. In addition, the dual-class structure does not represent absolute stability of operating rights, and a few samples show that dual-class companies are acquired as subsidiaries of other companies.

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