當一個販賣體驗型產品之新進廠商進入市場時，消費者往往難以在一開始就對其進行完整的質量評估，但隨著時間推移，消費者將能透過社會學習效應(Social Learning)補充其對該新產品的質量認知，並重新評估其效用，進而做出可能的購買決策。本研究以常見的體驗型產品，即數位軟體產品為例，透過建立兩期量化模型，探討一個已存在市場上之既存廠商，在消費者對其商品已有一定程度認知的情況下，面臨一個質量可能為較高或較低之新進廠商進入市場，且消費者對其具社會學習效應時，既存廠商應採取買斷制 (Perpetual)或是訂閱制 (Subscription) 做為其最佳應變策略以及消費者在的兩期購買行為將如何受到社會學習效應，再分析兩廠商於兩策略下之定價與兩期需求將如何受到社會學習效應影響，最後根據研究結果進一步對兩廠商提出管理意涵。同時，本研究亦欲探討當社會學習效應不過度發酵時，市場變化及既存廠商之最佳決策將有何改變。本研究發現，不管新進廠商為較高或是較低質量，需求市場皆隨社會學習效應不同而區分出不同之消費者行為，故既存廠商應同時考慮社會學習效應之強度與消費者對社會學習效應之敏感度大小，以做出最佳決策。而在既存廠商有機會阻撓新進廠商進入市場時，既存廠商卻不一定會選擇獨占市場，有時競爭反而對其更加有利，且社會學習效應之存在對於既存廠商來說也並非完全不利。本研究亦發現，在既存廠商試圖最大化其總獲利時，並不能同時減緩新進廠商兩期總需求增長之幅度或是減緩其第二期需求被侵蝕之幅度。而在社會學習效應不過度發酵時，研究結果表示，不管新進廠商質量為何，訂閱制恆為優勢策略之條件皆有變化，買斷制恆為優勢策略之條件則不因此而改變，而在新進廠商為較低質量時，既存廠商將無法透過買斷制來阻撓新進廠商進入市場。

It is often difficult for consumers to assess the quality of a new entrant selling experience goods, but over time, consumers will supplement their quality awareness of the new product through social learning, and then make possible purchasing decisions. Taking digital software products as an example, this study explores which strategy should the incumbent take, the perpetual, or the subscription strategy, to maximize its total profit when it faces a new entrant with higher or lower quality in the presence of social learning. This study intends to explore how the social learning effect will change consumers' two-period purchasing behavior and the incumbent’s pricing and demand. Besides, this study also intends to explore how the market and the incumbent’s optimal strategy will change when the social learning is not excessively fermented. By establishing a two-period analytical model, this study finds that, regardless of the quality of new entrants, the market distinguishes different consumer behaviors according to the social learning. Therefore, the incumbent should consider both the intensity of the social learning and consumers’ sensitivity of social learning to make the best decision. When the incumbent has the opportunity to prevent new entrants from entering the market, it may not choose to monopolize the market. Sometimes competition is more beneficial to it, and the existence of social learning is not completely disadvantageous to the incumbent. In addition, the incumbent cannot simultaneously slow down the growth of total demand for new entrants in both periods or slow down the erosion of its second-period demand when it tries to maximize its total profit. When the social learning is not excessively fermented, the conditions for the subscription to remain the dominant strategy will change. When the new entrant’s quality is lower, the incumbent will not be able to prevent new entrants from entering the market through the perpetual strategy.

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