幾千來以來，拍賣(auction)一直是被人們用來買賣物品的方式之一。隨著電子商務(e-Commerce)的蓬勃發展，透過網路(Internet)拍賣物品比過去更為盛行，也吸引了越來越多的學者專注於拍賣理論(auction theory)的發展，包括理論性和實證性的研究。
　　拍賣中的買賣雙方對物品的估價或是買方的購買意願等，皆牽涉某一程度的不確定性，例如：估價往往不會是ㄧ個明確的值，而是一個區間，因此模糊理論成為一個很好的表達工具。本研究主要擴展了Fang et al. (2004)之模糊拍賣模式，加入考慮物品間綜效(synergy)的影響。當舉行連續拍賣(sequential auction)時，買方得標或未得標某一物品時，因為物品間綜效關係，使得得標者會改變對後面拍賣物品的估價(valuation)，且拍賣次序較前面的物品其結標價格會對競標者產生出價上的影響。本研究藉由調整競標者的競標意願程度，而改變競標者對後面同質性物品之意願出價價格，所發展之模式將更符合實際之情況，並利用基因演算法(Genetic Algorithm)求解出能使得賣方利潤最大的拍賣物品排序。

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