傳統單一工廠內部的熱交換器網路設計，因僅能考慮自身程序流間的搭配，往往
不能達到工業園區熱整合的最大效益。但若考慮廠際熱交換，則每間工廠必須面對與其
廠競爭且合作的局面。換言之，工廠間雖可藉由彼此共用公用設施來達到降低自身生產
成本的目的，但同時也必須最大化自身獲利。而牽涉到此一競合關係是否能穩定存在的
關鍵，就是廠際熱交換是否能有一個公平且合乎各工廠自身的利益最大化的交易模式。
因此在本論文中我們引進賽局理論，並搭配運載模式，設法為廠際熱交換器網路設計問
題尋找最佳均衡解，進而建構出合理、可行且多贏的廠內及廠際熱交換網路。

Since, in a conventional heat exchanger network design, only the hot and cold streams
within a single process can be matched, the maximum possible benefit of multi-plant heat
integration in an industrial park may not be realizable with this approach. If inter-plant heat
exchanges are permissible, then each plant may have to compete and, at the same time,
cooperate with the other plants on site. In other words, although it is possible to reduce the
overall operating cost by sharing heating and cooling utilities, each plant must also try to
maximize its own financial gain. The presence of a stable equilibrium point in this situation
hinges upon a suitable price model for energy trading. In this study, the transshipment model
is modified according to game theory for the purpose of calculating the minimum hot and cold
utility consumption rates of all plants, the best trade prices and also the corresponding
inter-plant heat flows. On the basis of these results, a MILP model can then be formulated to
minimize the total number of matches and to identify the heat duty of every match. Finally,
two NLP models can be built accordingly to synthesize the optimal heat exchanger network
and to compute the payments shared by plants involved in every inter-plant heat exchange.

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