本研究是以路線貨運業者為例，探討有主從關係的雙占市場，兩位業者間需求皆固定的情境一及領導者需求不確定但已知跟隨者需求確定的情境二下，推導出跟隨者的反應函數，並利用這反應函數進行stackelberg運算，代入領導者的利潤函數，來求得兩位業者的stackelberg均衡貨運量。
在情境二中，本研究導入超額訂單的概念，參考報童模型的模式，並從文獻尋找適當的利潤函數表現方式，寫出本研究的利潤函數，來進行業者間stackelberg運算，並同時求解超額訂單的均衡運能（運輸規劃的capacity）。
本研究使用目前適合台灣貨運業市場的需求反函數，並使用更貼近市場狀況的常態分配的需求不確定性，結果發現可用航空業超額訂位（overbooking）的概念，來發展本研究的超額訂單（over-order）運能規劃，來降低業者的不確定性，並得到更好的市場均衡價格及利潤 。

This study is focused on the duopoly market’s stackelberg equilibrium of the two carriers in the freight delivery industry. The leader carrier of the market as our research main subject and our study objective is to find out the carriers’ best response under our two designed scenario model, once is the both carrier demand are certain and another one is the leader’s demand is affected by a non-price factor. And we derived the reaction function of follower and designed a calculating process to solve our model problem. We introduced an over-order concept into our second scenario which is learned from the overbooking and newsboy model literature expected to solve the uncertainty demand of leader and to get more profit. We used the Cobb-Douglas nonlinear inverse demand function to find out the demand and equilibrium price of the market and this function have proved suitable for described the less-than-truckload freight market of Taiwan. We used a hub-and spoke operations network to test our calculating model and find out that we can get a higher equilibrium market price and more profit through our designed over-order model.

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