由於台灣代工產業前景不明，許多代工製造商冀望透過自創品牌來找到一條新出路，而在有限的市場需求下，此行動勢必對其品牌客戶產生一定程度的影響，應該思考如何妥善處理兩者之間的關係。本研究因此建構一個符合現況的數學模型，其中包含一個代工製造商加上一個品牌客戶所組成的供應鏈，利用了品牌客戶為領導者 (Leader) 的 Stackelberg 賽局方法，進行產品品質和定價的決策。並且針對一般自創品牌較常見的產品開發策略模擬出自行研發、兩階段費用授權-單位權利金授權加固定費用及兩階段費用授權-從價權利金授權加固定費用三種情境，再根據各情境的均衡結果趨勢進行分析和比較。
從研究結果來看，在目前競爭激烈的市場環境中，代工製造商自創品牌對品牌客戶是有利的，在面對價格敏感度低的市場客戶時，兩家公司會傾向由代工製造商自行研發產品較為有利，而面對價格敏感度高的市場客戶則讓品牌客戶進行兩階段費用授權-單位權利金授權為宜。品質競爭強度的結果，則建議採用兩階段費用授權-單位權利金授權，但代工製造商不進入高品質敏感度的市場。除此之外，研究中還發現，在代工製造商自創品牌時，授權者(品牌客戶)若要選擇授權，更喜歡採用兩階段費用授權-單位權利金授權，而代工製造商則較喜歡兩階段費用授權-從價權利金授權。

Due to the unclear prospect in Taiwan’s Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) industry, many manufacturers hope to seek a way out through self-branding. Under limited market demand, this may lead to an impact on its branded customers. Therefore, maintaining a proper relationship between the two should be taken into consideration. This study establishes a mathematical model that conforms to the current situation, including building a supply chain composed of the OEM and its branded customer, applying the Stackelberg game method where the branded customer acts as a leader and makes decisions on product quality and pricing. Three simulated scenarios were developed as strategies of common product development with self-branding: Research and Development (R&D), two-part tariff licensing based on per-unit royalty plus fixed fee, and two-part tariff licensing based on ad valorem royalty plus fixed fee. Each scenario’s resulting equilibrium trend chart was subsequently analyzed and compared.
Results indicate that, in the current competitive market environment, self-branding of the OEM is beneficial to its branded customer. For customers with low price sensitivity, it is more beneficial for both companies if R&D is conducted by the OEM. For customers with high price sensitivity, it is preferable to adopt a two-part tariff licensing based on per-unit royalty. Results of quality competition intensity, a two-part tariff licensing based on per-unit royalty is recommended. But OEM do not enter the market of high-quality sensitivity. In addition, this study finds that the licensor (branded customer) prefers per-unit royalty while the OEM prefers ad valorem royalty when the OEM employs a self-branding strategy.

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