本研究欲探討企業履行員工認股權之方式對財務風險的影響。當員工行使認股權時，企業需支付股票以履行義務，依據現行法規規定，企業履約的方式有兩種：一、從公開市場購回庫藏股，再以約定價格轉讓予員工；二、直接發行新股予員工。若企業以庫藏股的方式履約，因購回庫藏股時需支付現金，故此法會使企業產生現金流出；反之，若以發行新股的方式為之，則不會有現金流出的情形。本研究聚焦在兩種履約方式的現金流量效果，是否會對企業之財務風險產生影響，並以Z_SCORE(Altman，1968)作為財務風險的衡量指標。

本研究以2004-2009年國內上市櫃電子產業為研究對象，以最小平方法(OLS)進行實證分析，結果顯示：若企業以庫藏股的方式履行員工認股權，因有現金流出的情形，會增加企業的財務風險；反之，若企業以發新股的方式履行員工認股權，因沒有現金流出的情形，故對企業的財務風險沒有不利影響。若企業部份員工認股權以庫藏股的方式履行，部分以發新股的方式履行，則庫藏股產生之現金流出效果對企業財務風險的不利影響依舊存在，只是影響的程度較全部以庫藏股履約的方式小。

Firms typically have two ways to delivery shares to their employees when they exercise the employee stock options (ESOs) .Firms can either acquire treasury shares from the open market or issue new shares to employees. For firms that repurchase shares, the settlement of ESOs generates cash outflows, which reduce net assets available to service debt and thereby negatively affect firms’ financial risk. By contrast, for firms that choose to issue new shares, the settlement of ESOs does not affect cash flows. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the ways that firms choose to fulfill the terms of ESO obligations affect firms’ financial risk.

To address our research questions, we collect publicly electronic industrial firms in Taiwan for the years 2004-2009.The empirical results suggest that the use of treasury stock to fulfill the ESO obligations has unfavorable effect on the issuer's financial risk. Conversely, the issuance of new shares to satisfy ESO exercises does not have unfavorable effect on the issuer's financial risk.

中文
王志仁. (2007). 我國上市公司實施員工認股權憑證與庫藏股制度之關聯性研究. 碩士, 長庚大學.
陳琬鈺. (2006). 我國會計師事務所簽證客戶財務風險之研究 -利用Altman (1968) Z-Score. 碩士, 國立成功大學, 台南市.
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