| 研究生: |
楊雅涵 Yang, Ya-Han |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
高風險性資產與會計師更換:以金融風暴後之美國金融業為例 Financial Assets at Fair Value and Auditor Switch: Evidence from the Post-Crisis Era |
| 指導教授: |
陳政芳
Chen, Jeng-Fang 黃炳勳 Huang, Ping-Hsun |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 會計學系 Department of Accountancy |
| 論文出版年: | 2012 |
| 畢業學年度: | 100 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 38 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 第三級公允價值資產 、更換會計師 、審計公費 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Level3 fair value assets, Audit switches, Audit fees |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:158 下載:1 |
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本研究主要探討金融風暴過後,金融業之公允價值衡量的高風險性資產與其會計師更換之間的關聯性。金融風暴後,雷曼兄弟(Leman Brother)破產導致Ernst & Young會計師事務所聲譽受損,因此,本研究主要以Ernst & Young會計師事務所查核之金融業為對象,探討持有以公允價值衡量之高風險金融資產的公司是否較易更換至審計品質較好的會計師事務所。
SFAS157將資產公允價值的衡量分為三個階層,而分級的依據是根據資產的流動性來區分,第三級的資產相對而言是較不具流動性的,且第三級公允價值資產的查核可能存在較高的系統風險以及資訊不對稱的現象(Riedl and Serafeim 2011)。本研究即探討,該項高風險的資產是否使Ernst & Young客戶轉由產業專家會計師事務所查核。此外本研究進一步探討持有高風險資產卻仍繼續由Ernst & Young查核的金融客戶,是否因Ernst & Young聲譽受損而享有較低的審計公費。
本研究實證結果顯示,在金融風暴後,有較高第三級公允價值資產的Ernst & Young客戶,較容易轉由產業專家會計師事務所查核。此外本研究亦發現,在金融風暴後,有較高第三級公允價值資產且繼續由Ernst &Young查核的客戶,其享有較低的審計公費。此實證研究結果隱含聲譽受損的會計師事務會以較低公費挽留客戶。
This study aims to examine the relationship between high risk financial assets and auditor switches after financial crisis. The collapse of Leman Brother leads to damage the reputation of Ernst & Young. As a result, our study focus on Ernst & Young’s clients that are financial institutions in the U.S., and examine whether company with high risk financial assets are inclined to switch to higher quality accounting firm.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (FAS No. 157) classifies the information used in fair value measurements into three levels by the liquidity of assets. For level 3 fair value assets, which show a lower level of liquidity, it may cause high system risk and information asymmetry. This study focuses on the influence of high risk financial assets on auditor switching from Ernst & Young to industry specialist. Furthermore, our study examines whether Ernst & Young’s financial institution clients benefit from the poor reputation of Ernst & Young and resulted in lower audit fees charged.
The empirical results indicated that the clients of Ernst & Young with more high risk financial assets were inclined to switch to industry specialist after financial crisis. Furthermore, we found that Ernst & Young’s clients, who didn’t switch auditor after the financial crisis, have lower audit fees. The evidence implied that the accounting firms with poor reputation will charge lower audit fees in order to keep their clients.
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校內:2022-12-31公開