2018年中國監察體制改革後，留置成為針對公職人員與企業高管的主要調查手段。此制度常切斷被調查人對外聯繫，形成獨特的資訊真空。既有文獻多探討政治關聯對企業價值的影響，卻少有研究剖析在缺乏官方資訊下，高管特徵如何影響資本市場對政治與治理風險的定價。
本研究結合高階梯隊理論與訊號理論，以2021年1月至2026年4月中國A股上市公司高管留置事件122筆為樣本，透過事件研究法檢驗其對企業價值的短期影響。研究聚焦於留置公告的市場反應、核心高管被留置之衝擊差異、產權性質的調節效果，以及性別特徵對市場反應之影響。實證結果顯示：第一，留置公告引發顯著的負向累積異常報酬。第二，核心高管被留置的股價衝擊顯著大於非核心高管，民營企業所受衝擊顯著大於國有企業，性別差異的影響則不顯著。
本研究填補了中國監察體制改革後，留置事件對資本市場影響的文獻缺口，不僅揭示市場對核心高管與產權性質的差異化定價邏輯，更深化高階梯隊理論於政治風險情境之應用，為全球投資人與監管機構理解新興市場政治風險的定價機制提供嶄新的實證視角。

Following China's 2018 supervisory reform, liuzhi (detention) became the primary investigative measure for public officials and corporate executives. This system often cuts off the detainee's external communication, creating an information vacuum. Existing literature has largely examined how political connections affect firm value, yet few studies analyze how, absent official information, executive characteristics shape the capital market's pricing of political and governance risk.
Integrating Upper Echelons Theory with Signaling Theory, this study takes 122 executive detention events at Chinese A-share listed companies from January 2021 to April 2026 as its sample and uses the event study method to examine their short-term effect on firm value. It focuses on the market reaction to detention announcements, differences in impact by core-executive status, the moderating effect of ownership type, and the effect of gender. The results show that, first, detention announcements trigger significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns; and second, the stock-price impact is significantly greater for core than non-core executives and for private than state-owned firms, while gender is insignificant.
This study fills a gap in the literature on the capital-market consequences of detention under the post-reform regime. It reveals the market's differentiated pricing of core-executive status and ownership type, extends Upper Echelons Theory to a political-risk setting, and offers a novel empirical perspective for global investors and regulators on the pricing of political risk in emerging markets.

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