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研究生: 張祐瑄
Chang, Yu-Hsuan
論文名稱: 產業競賽誘因與內部資金配置效率
Industry Tournament Incentives and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency
指導教授: 周庭楷
Chou, Ting-Kai
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年: 2021
畢業學年度: 109
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 40
中文關鍵詞: 產業競賽誘因內部資金配置效率代理問題流動性
外文關鍵詞: industry tournament incentives, internal capital allocation efficiency, agency problems, mobility
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  • 本研究探討產業競賽誘因與內部資金配置效率之關係。產業競賽誘因之概念為同產業薪酬第二高的執行長與該公司執行長(CEO)之總薪酬差距,當產業競賽誘因越大時,可能帶來激勵效應,CEO會為了能夠轉換至給予較高薪酬的同產業其他間公司任職,而努力提高公司內部資金配置效率,相反地,也可能加深CEO謀取私利的意圖,為了短時間內提高公司績效,而執行反功能決策,導致內部資金配置不效率。實證結果顯示,產業競賽誘因與內部資金配置效率呈正向關係,說明總薪酬差距越大時,會促使CEO與股東間利益一致,激勵CEO有效率地配置內部資金。另外,本研究亦發現,CEO流動性較高的情況下,即CEO轉換至其他間公司任職之意願較高或機率較大時,會強化產業競賽誘因所帶來的激勵效果。

    The objective of this research is to examine the relationship between industry tournament incentives and internal capital allocation efficiency. We analyze this issue through the diversified firms that went public in the U.S. from 1992 to 2019. Then, industry tournament incentives are measured by the total compensation gap between the CEO and the CEO with the second-highest paid in the same industry. The empirical result presents that industry tournament incentives are positively associated with internal capital allocation efficiency, indicating that industry tournament incentives will align the interests between management and shareholders and incentivize CEOs to allocate internal funds more efficiently. In addition, we also find that when CEO mobility is high, that is, when the CEO has a higher probability of switching to another company, the incentive effect induced by industry tournament incentives will be strengthened.

    第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 5 第一節 產業競賽誘因相關文獻 5 第二節 內部資金配置效率相關文獻 6 第三節 假說推論 8 第三章 研究設計 10 第一節 變數衡量 10 第二節 實證模型設計 13 第三節 資料來源與樣本選取 15 第四章 實證結果分析 17 第一節 敘述統計分析 17 第二節 相關係數分析 18 第三節 多元迴歸分析 21 第四節 穩健性測試 25 第五章 結論 31 參考文獻 33 附錄 變數定義 37

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