本篇論文探討CEO任期與管理者自願揭露盈餘預測的關係。我們從實證結果發現，CEO任期與自願揭露盈餘預測的可能性及揭露的頻率呈正向顯著。此外，一旦CEO決定要發佈盈餘預測的情況下，我們也發現任期較短的CEO比較頃向於選擇區間估計的揭露形式。整體而言，任期較短的CEO發佈盈餘預測的可能性與頻率較低，並且使用相對保守的區間估計來傳達給市場參與者。這個實證結果顯示並支持：對於資淺的CEO而言，他們風險趨避的考量大於聲譽建立的動機。

We examine the impact of chief executive officer tenure on the behavior of voluntary management earnings forecasts. We find that CEO tenure is positively associated with the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts and its frequency. We also find that short-tenured CEOs are more likely to use the range form. Overall, our studies imply that junior CEOs are less likely to issue their forecasts, decrease the number of their forecasts, and convey their forecasts using the conservative form relative to the market. These results support the perspective that new CEOs are more concerned about the risk-avoidance incentive than the reputation-building incentive.

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