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研究生: 李炳昌
Lee, Ping-Chang
論文名稱: 現金持有與銀行信用額度在公司財務上的角色:台灣上市公司的實證
The role of cash holdings and bank credit lines in corporate finance: Evidence from Taiwan listed companies
指導教授: 康信鴻
Kang, Hsin-Hong
學位類別: 博士
Doctor
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 企業管理學系
Department of Business Administration
論文出版年: 2018
畢業學年度: 106
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 81
中文關鍵詞: 現金持有信用額度規模效應分量迴歸靜態抵換模型
外文關鍵詞: cash holding, lines of credit, size effect, quantile regression, static trade-off theory
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  • 現金(資產)和銀行的信用額度(負債)兩者在公司的流動性中扮演重要角色,本篇論文主要以2001-2016年台灣上市非金融公司的資料為樣本,探討公司現金與銀行信用額度之間的關係,及其兩者對公司績效與公司價值的影響。在本篇論文,我分別提供OLS、固定效果模型(LSDV)及分量模型迴歸結果,並比較一般產業及電子產業在公司流動性政策上差異。本論文實證結果有下列結論:
    1. 現金和銀行信用額度之間有顯著的負向關係,亦即隨著增加銀行信用額度的使用,公司持有的現金會減少,此意味著兩者互為替代品;就分量的角度來看,隨著增加銀行信用額度的使用,公司的現金會減少得更多,亦即兩者間的替代關係是遞增的。就不同產業而言,電子業則較一般產業有較強的替代性。
    2. 公司的現金持有與公司規模成反向關係,亦即隨著公司的規模擴大,其現金持有的比率愈低,顯示公司的現金管理仍存在規模經濟(economies of scale)的效應,這個結果支持靜態抵換理論(Static Trade-off Theory)的論點;此外,就分量的角度來看,負的規模效應是遞增的,亦即愈高的分位(i th),其規模經濟的效應愈明顯。
    3. 公司增加其現金持有比率、資產規模及管理股權比率有利於公司財務績效;但使用銀行信用額度及負債則與公司績效有反向效果。
    4. 實證結果顯示,公司持有現金比率每增加1%,公司的股價會增加0.0231%;同時也發現,現金在電子業比一般產業有更高的邊際價值,因此,就邊際效用理論而言,此提供了為何電子產業會持有比一般產業顯著更多現金的一個論證。
    5. 使用銀行信用額度(短期)與公司價值呈反向關係;但利用槓桿(包含長期)則對公司價值則有正向效果。此顯示,就長期觀點,負債規劃可以提升公司價值。

    This paper investigates the relationship of corporate cash holdings with the use of credit line and firm value. Using a panel data of 842 Taiwan listed nonfinancial firms over the period 2001-2016, by both ordinary least squares approach and quantile regression approach conduct comparative analysis, I concluded following findings. First, the use of bank credit lines has a significant and negative effect on corporate cash/assets ratio and this means that bank line of credit is considered as a substitute for cash. In term of quantile regression, I find that the substitution effect between cash ratio and bank credit lines have an increasing increase relationship with each higher ith quantile. In addition, the firm size has a significantly negative impact on cash holdings shows that firm’s cash management still has the effect of economies of scale and supporting the static trade-off theory. Also, I find that the size effect of corporate cash holdings presents an increasing increase with each higher ith quantile. Second, increasing the cash/assets ratio, firm size, and ownership management ratio is contributed to firm performance, but using bank credit lines and financial leverage have the opposite results. Finally, I find that the cash/assets ratio increases by 1%, the firm’s stock price increase by 0.0231%, namely firm value increase is accompanied by its cash holdings increase. Furthermore, I also find that the margin value of cash in the electronics industry is more than of in the general industry and this support that the value of cash is not the same in different firms.

    Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 7 2.1 Cash management models 7 2.1.1 Baumol’s Model 7 2.1.2 Miller and Orr Model 8 2.1.3 The static tradeoff theory 9 2.1.4 The pecking order theory 10 2.1.5 The free cash flow theory. 11 2.2 The motives for company holding cash 12 2.2.1 The transaction motive 12 2.2.2 The precautionary motive 13 2.2.3 The speculative motive 14 2.2.4 The agency motive 14 2.2.5 Tax avoidance motive 15 2.2.6 Acquisition motive 16 2.3 Cash holdings versus bank credit lines 17 2.4 Corporate cash holdings, financial performance, and firm value 19 3. Methodology 21 3.1 Data and method 21 3.2 Models and variables 22 3.3 The quantile regression model 28 3.4 Descriptive statistics 29 4. Results and analysis 36 4.1 The determinant of corporate cash holdings 36 4.2 The relationship of corporate cash holdings with financial performance 46 4.3 Corporate cash holdings, lines of credit, and firm value 58 5. Conclusion 65 Reference 69 Appendix 74

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