相較傳統製造方式，再製造可有效減少環境負擔，而政府則可提出各項環保政策來降低環境負擔。故本研究探討兩期閉環供應鏈，包含一製造商與一再製商，兩廠商間為動態定價競爭，製造商僅製造新品，並負擔部分環境負擔之處理成本，再製商則回收使用過之新品再製成再製品。政府可選擇是否制定政策介入兩廠商間的定價競爭：其一、無補貼情境，作為基礎情境；其二、政府決定兩期單位補貼額度，對購買再製品之消費者進行單位補貼；其三、政府決定兩期定額補貼比例，對再製商提供與環境負擔相關的定額補貼。本研究針對三種情境，推導兩廠商最大化各自總利潤之均衡定價，與政府提升再製商產量之補貼政策，並透過對決策變數、利潤與社會福利進行性質分析與數值分析，探討政府施政如何影響整個社會。本研究發現：(1)在製造商承擔環境成本比例與再製品環保程度呈現特殊關係下，單位補貼綠色消費者既能增加再製品需求，進而提升再製商利潤，又可以減少製造商所承擔的環境成本，使兩廠商都獲得更高的利潤。(2)當新品與再製品兩者對於消費者而言具有近乎相同的價值時，製造商能因單位補貼綠色消費者政策得到更多利潤；再製商則因補貼政策生產最大回收量，而失去原本應得的利潤。(3) 當再製品不夠環保時，實施兩種補貼政策反而會因環境負擔改善幅度太小，使社會福利下降。(4) 在製造商總利潤、總消費者剩餘、總環境負擔與總社會福利方面，兩種補貼政策有相同的結果，政府能依據預算額度選擇適合的政策。

In this study, we consider the two-period closed-loop supply chain, including a manufacturer and an independent remanufacturer. The manufacturer only produces new products and sells them to the market, and bears a portion of some environmental impacts cost. The remanufacturer recycles End-Of-Life (EOL) and remanufactures them, and sells them to the same market and compete with new products in pricing. The government can choose whether to implement subsidy policies to affect the two firms: one is not providing any subsidy; the second is the unit subsidy to green consumers; the third is the lump-sum subsidy to remanufacturer. We derive the equilibrium prices of the two manufacturers, and the government's policy to increase the output of remanufacturer. In addition, we do the analytical analysis and the numerical analysis on decision variables, firms' profits, and social welfare, and know how government intervention affects social welfare. Through analytical and numerical analysis, we find the following insights: (1) Two firms can both get more profits from unit-subsidy policy in certain situation. (2) If there’s almost no difference between new product and remanufactured one to consumers, manufacturer can get more profits from unit-subsidy policy, but remanufacturer get less profit because of government intervention. (3) When remanufactured product isn’t green enough, the two subsidy policies implementing will reduce social welfare. (4) On manufacturer’s total profit, total consumer surplus, total environmental impact and total social welfare, they are the same in two subsidy scenarios. As a result, government can choose policy based on his budget.

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