國內在經歷一連串的環境污染與食安問題後，喚起了社會大眾及企業對於自身環境與食用安全之意識，亦促使各企業開始著眼重視『企業社會責任』，更加重視環境保護議題與相關政策之實施。目前全球皆面臨因溫室氣體效應而造成各地暖化危機，故國際社會皆致力於減少碳的產生與排放，以維繫全球生態之平衡。在此研究背景下，本研究探討企業政商關係與自願揭露環境污染資訊 (碳排放量)之關聯性。
本研究以2008至2012年台灣上市企業為研究對象，利用迴歸分析方法進行實證之結果顯示，在揭露意願較高的產業中，政商關係與企業自願性揭露環境污染資訊的意願呈正相關。此結果隱含，由於具有政商關係之企業較易吸引社會大眾的目光，且目前企業社會責任之風氣日益盛行，故較願意自願性的揭露環境污染資訊，以樹立優質企業之形象，同時亦符合全民監督之期待。
然而，額外測試實證結果顯示，具有政商關係之企業，其揭露的碳排放數量反而較低。可能原因之一為，具有政治影響力者，會選擇任職於低汙染的企業，以避免後續對自身聲譽有負面影響。另外，亦有可能具有政商關係的企業，自恃有政治保護傘，而選擇低報其碳排放量。

After experiencing a spate of domestic environmental toxic wastewater pollution and edible oil scandals, both the public and corporate environments have become more aware of food safety, and have focused on promoting "corporate social responsibility", meaning more attention to environmental issues and related government policies. Due to global warming caused by various human activity, the international community is committed to reducing carbon emissions to maintain global ecological balance. Under this background, this study investigates the relationship between business-political connections and the voluntary disclosure of information on environmental pollution (carbon emissions).
In this study, using Taiwan from 2008 to 2012 as sample, I find that firms with political connections and the exposure of environmental information were positively correlated. The result implies that due to a firm’s political relations, it is easier to attract the public's attention. Furthermore, because of the current trend of increasing prevalence of corporate social responsibility, enterprises are more willing to voluntarily disclose environmental information to establish a positive image of quality and trust, which is also in line with the notion of supervision by the people.
However, additional empirical results of the test showed that the amount of carbon emissions which firms with political connections revealed is low. One of the reasons is maybe because people with political influence will choose to serve on corporations with lower pollutions, in order to avoid any negative follow-up impact on reputation. In addition, some firms with political connections count on the political umbrella, and are free to underreport their carbon emissions.

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