企業經營公司治理議題自1997年亞洲金融風暴及2001年美國恩龍案爆發後即成為全球注目焦點，而台灣的產業在面臨全球化競爭下，亦必須藉由改善經營公司治理議題自為全球注目焦點，而台灣的產業在面臨全球化競爭下，亦必須藉由改善本身的治理系統，提昇其於國際市場上的競爭力
規模、外部董事佔董事比例、具財務法律背景擔任董事、為期相關研究變數
本身的治理系統，提昇其於國際市場上的競爭力

研究方法包含敘述統計、主成份分析法(PCA)、信度效度分析、等相關研究分析研究結果發現，在台灣，獨立董監事佔總董事人數比率與揭露總分間呈顯著正相關，與預期符合。顯示獨立董監事隨著佔總董事人數比率的增公司治理變數包含董事會企業經營公司治理議題自1997年亞洲金融風暴及2001年美國恩龍案爆發後即成為全球注目焦點，而台灣的產業在面臨全球化競爭下，亦必須藉由改善本身的治理系統，提昇其於國際市場上的競爭力。

管理階層及避免關係人交易才有好的公司治理，至於好的公司治理，是否可以防止公司發生舞弊的機會保障各利害關係人的利益，進而提高公司經營的績效，以創造全體股東利益的最大化，是本研究的主要課題。

加，其發揮自身專業能力監督公司的影響力亦增加.
公司本身內部控制機制.與其經營有深遠影響.越完善.其相對公司經營機制越上軌道.

以正直誠信領導人及相對於公司董監事.及獨立領導人.對公司經營有正向思考.

Variable contains directorate enterprise management company rule topic since in 1997 Asia finance storm and in 2001 America kindness dragon case break out behind become global observation focus namely, but formosan industry is facing globalization competition under, must by means of by ameliorate in itself rule system also, promote its competitive power in international market on.

Administration estate and avoid party bargain just have good company rule, as far as good company rule, whether can prevent company take place embezzler's chance indemnify each interested party's benefit, and furthur enhance company management's performance, as create all stockholder benefit's maximize, is this research issue chief.

Magnitude, exterior director occupies director proportion, have finance law background undertake director, for relative research variable.

Research means contains narrate stat, staple method of analysis (PCA), letter degree effect degree analyze, wait for relative research analysis findings discover, at Taiwan, independent Dong supervisor occupy general director number ratio and disclose total score between submit conspicuous is relativing to, and expect accord with. Show independent Dong supervisor along with occupy general director number ratio's increase, it exerts oneself profession ability intendance corporate influence increase also.
Company in itself inside control mechanism. Than run have profound affection. More perfect. It relative company management machine-made more on the right track.
As honest unusual good faith leader and each other towards company Dong supervisor. And is independent leader. Management have just to good think to the company.

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