| 研究生: |
陳靜宜 Chen, Jing-yi |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
經理人股票選擇權的風險誘因與策略聯盟 Risk Incentives of Executive Stock Options and Strategic Alliances |
| 指導教授: |
陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 財務金融研究所 Graduate Institute of Finance |
| 論文出版年: | 2008 |
| 畢業學年度: | 96 |
| 語文別: | 英文 |
| 論文頁數: | 73 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | Executive stock options, Alliance, Risk-taking, Performance |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:66 下載:0 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
A distinctive feature of stock options is that they create incentives for managers to take risks. For a sample of 12,071 firm-year alliances over 1992-2003, we find that risk-taking incentives offered by executive stock options (the sensitivity of ESO values to stock return volatility) are statistically associated with greater risk-taking behavior as proxied by one-year ahead alliances. Furthermore, in order to examine the extent to which incentives increase executives’ risk taking, we use two criteria to classify alliances according to the different risk level involved. One is based on the exploration-exploitation framework (March, 1991), and we find that the risk-taking incentives of ESOs encourage managers to undertake more exploitation rather than exploration alliances. The other criterion to classify alliances is according to whether it is a technological or a marketing alliance (Das et al. 1998, 2003). We find that the motivation effect of ESO risk-taking incentives is more significant in technological alliances than in marketing alliances. With regard to the future firm performance after entering into alliances, we find a positive association between ESO risk-taking incentives and subsequent operating performance. When examining different risk level alliances, the positive correlation of ESO risk-taking incentives to firm performance is significantly greater in exploitation rather than in exploration alliances. However, technological and marketing alliances do not exhibit significant differences in the positive correlation of ESO risk-taking incentives to firm performance. Overall, our results are consistent with the idea that ESOs provide executives with incentives to focus on shareholder value-maximizing alliances.
REFERENCE
1. Agrawal, A. and G.N. Mandelker, Managerial incentives and corporate investment and financing decisions. The Journal of Finance. 42(4): p. 823-837, 1987.
2. Anand, B.N. and T. Khanna, Do firms learn to create value? The case of alliances. Strategic Management Journal. 21: p. 295-315, 2000.
3. Anderson, M.C., R.D. Banker, and S. Ravindran, Executive compensation in the information technology industry. Management Science. 46(4): p. 530-547, 2000.
4. Barber, B. and J. Lyon, Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 41: p. 359-399, 1996.
5. Baum, J.A.C. and C. Oliver, Institutional linkages and organizational mortality. Administrative Science Quarterly. 36: p. 187-218, 1991.
6. Bayona, C., P. Corredor, and R. Santamaria, Technological alliances and the market valuation of new economy firms. Technovation. 26: p. 369-383, 2006.
7. Benner, M.J. and M. Tushman, Process management and technological innovation: A longitudinal study of the photography and paint industries. Administrative Science Quarterly. 47(4): p. 676-706, 2002.
8. Berg, S.V. and P. Friedman, Corporate courtship and successful joint ventures. California Management Review. 23: p. 85-91, 1980.
9. Bryan, S., L. Hwang, and S. Lilien, CEO stock-based compensation: An empirical analysis of incentive-intensity, relative mix, and economic determinants. Journal of Business. 73(4): p. 661-693, 2000.
10. Burgers, W.P., C.W.L. Hill, and W.C. Kim, A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry. Strategic Management Journal. 14: p. 419-432, 1993.
11. Carpenter, J.N., Does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite? Journal of Finance. 55(5): p. 2311-2331, 2000.
12. Chan, L., J. Lakonishok, and T. Sougiannis, The stock market valuation of research and development expenditures. The Journal of Finance. 56(6): p. 2431-2456, 2001.
13. Chan, S.H., et al., Do strategic alliances create value? Journal of Financial Economics. 46: p. 199-221, 1997.
14. Chen, Y.T. and A.H.V.d. Van, Learning the innovation journey: Order out of chaos? Organization Science. 7: p. 593-614, 1996.
15. Cheng, S., R&D expenditures and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review. 79(2): p. 305-328, 2004.
16. Christensen, C.M., The innovator's dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms to fail. Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 1997.
17. Cohen, R., B. Hall, and L. Viceira, Do executive stock options encourage risk taking? Working Paper, 2000.
18. Coles, J.L., N.D. Daniel, and L. Naveen, Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics. 79: p. 431-468, 2006.
19. Core, J. and W. Guay, Estimating the incentive effects of executive stock option portfolios. Working Paper, 1998.
20. Core, J. and W. Guay, The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 28: p. 151-184, 1999.
21. Dacin, M.T. and M.A. Hitt, Selecting partners for successful international alliances: Examination of U.S. and Korean firms. Journal of World Business 32(1): p. 3-16, 1997.
22. Das, S., P.K. Sen, and S. Sengupta, Impact of strategic alliances on firm valuation. Academy of Management Journal. 41(1): p. 27-41, 1998.
23. Das, S., P.K. Sen, and S. Sengupta, Strategic alliances: A valuable way to manage intellectual capital? Journal of Intellectual Capital. 4(1): p. 10-19, 2003.
24. Das, T.K. and B.S. Teng, Managing risks in strategic alliances. Academy of Management Executive. 13(4): p. 50-62, 1999.
25. Das, T.K. and B.S. Teng, A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. Journal of Management. 26: p. 31-61, 2000a.
26. Das, T.K. and B.S. Teng, A risk perception model of alliance structuring. Journal of International Management. 7: p. 1-29, 2001.
27. Datta, S., M. Iskandar-Datta, and K. Raman, Executive compensation and corporate acquisition decisions. The Journal of Finance. 56(6): p. 2299-2336, 2001.
28. Dechow, P.M., A.P. Hutton, and R.G. Sloan, Economic consequences of accounting for stock-based compensation. Journal of Accounting Research. 34: p. 1-20, 1996.
29. Deeds, D.L. and C.W.L. Hill, Strategic alliances and the rate of new product development: An empirical study of entrepreneurial biotechnology firms. Journal of Business Venturing. 11: p. 41-55, 1996.
30. Devers, C., R. Wiseman, and R. Holmes, The effects of endowment and loss aversion in managerial stock option valuation. Academy of Management Journal. 50(1): p. 191-208, 2007.
31. Doz, Y.L. and G. Hamel, Alliance advantage: The art of creating value through partnering. Harvard Business School Press 1998.
32. Gaver, J.J. and K.M. Gaver, Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Accounting & Economics. 16(1-3): p. 125-160, 1993.
33. George, G., S.A. Zahra, and D.R. Wood, The effects of business-university alliances on innovative output and financial performance: A study of publicly traded biotechnology companies. Journal of Business Venturing. 17: p. 577-609, 2002.
34. Grindley, P., Standards, strategy and policy: Cases and stories. Oxford University Press, New York. 1995.
35. Guay, W.R., The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics. 53(1): p. 43-71, 1999.
36. Gulati, R., Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal. 38(1): p. 85-112, 1995.
37. Hagedoorn, J., Understanding the rationale of strategic technology partnering: Interorganizational modes of cooperation and sectoral differences. Strategic Management Journal. 14: p. 371-385, 1993.
38. Hagedoorn, J. and J. Schakenraad, The effect of strategic technology alliances on company performance. Strategic Management Journal. 15: p. 291-309, 1994.
39. Hall, B., The pay to performance incentives of executive stock options. Working Paper, 1998.
40. Hall, B.J. and J.B. Liebman, Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113(3): p. 653-691, 1998.
41. Hamel, G., Y.L. Doz, and C.K. Prahalad, Collaborate with your competitors - and win. Harvard Business Review: p. 133-139, 1989.
42. Hanlon, M., S. Rajgopal, and T. Shevlin, Are executive stock options associated with future earnings? Journal of Accounting and Economics. 36(1-3): p. 3-43, 2003.
43. Hanlon, M., S. Rajgopal, and T. Shevlin, Large sample evidence on the effect of stock option compensation on risk taking and future operating performance. Working Paper, 2004.
44. Harrigan, K.R., Joint ventures and competitive strategy. Strategic Management Journal. 9: p. 141-158, 1988.
45. Harris, M. and A. Raviv, The theory of capital structure. Journal of Finance. 46(1): p. 297-355, 1991.
46. Haugen, R.A. and L.W. Senbet, Resolving the agency problems of external capital through options Journal of Finance. 36(3): p. 629-647, 1981.
47. Hemmer, T., O. Kim, and R.E. Verrecchia, Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 28: p. 307-327, 2000.
48. Hirshleifer, D. and R. Suh, Risk, managerial effort, and project choice. Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2: p. 308-345, 1992.
49. Hoang, H. and F. Rothaermel, The effect of general and partnerspecific alliance experience on joint R&D project performance. Academy of Management Journal. 48: p. 332-345, 2006.
50. Holmstrom, B., Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics. 10(1): p. 74-91, 1979.
51. Ittner, C.D., R.A. Lambert, and D.F. Larcker, The structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 34(1-3): p. 89-127, 2003.
52. Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, Theory of the firm : Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure Journal of Financial Economics. 3(4): p. 305-360, 1976.
53. Jensen, M.C. and K.J. Murphy, CEO incentives: it's not how much you pay, but how. Harvard Business Review. 68: p. 138-153, 1990.
54. Ju, N., H. Leland, and L.W. Sebnet, Options, option repricing and severance packages in managerial compensation: Their effects on corporate risk Working Paper, 2002.
55. Kato, H.K., et al., An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Financial Economics. 78(2): p. 435-461, 2005.
56. Kelm, K., V. Narayanan, and G. Pinches, Shareholder value creation during R&D innovation and commercialization stages. Academy of Management Journal. 38: p. 770-786, 1995.
57. Killing, J.P., Strategies for joint venture success. Praeger, New York, NY. 1983.
58. Knopf, J.D., J. Nam, and J.H. Thornton, The volatility and price sensitivities of managerial stock option portfolios and corporate hedging. Journal of Finance. 57(2): p. 801-813, 2002.
59. Kogut, B., Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives Strategic Management Journal 9: p. 319-332, 1988.
60. Kogut, B., The stability of joint ventures: reciprocity and competitive rivalry. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 38: p. 183-198, 1989.
61. Koh, J. and N. Venkatraman, Joint venture formations and stock market reactions: An assessment in the information technology sector. Academy of Management Journal. 34(4): p. 869-892, 1991.
62. Kotabe, M. and K.S. Swan, The role of strategic alliances in high-technology new product development. Strategic Management Journal. 16: p. 621-636, 1995.
63. Koza, M.P. and A.Y. Lewin, The co-evolution of strategic alliances. Organization Science. 9(3): p. 255-264, 1998.
64. Lambert, R.A., Executive effort and selection of risky projects. Rand Journal of Economics. 17(1): p. 77-88, 1986.
65. Lambert, R.A., D.F. Larcker, and R.E. Verrecchia, Portfolio consuderations in valuing executive compensation. Journal of Accounting Research. 29(1): p. 129-149, 1991.
66. Larcker, D.F., Discussion of "are executive stock options associated with future earnings?" Journal of Accounting and Economics. 36: p. 91-103, 2003.
67. Lavie, D. and L. Rosenkopf, Balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance formation. Academy of Management Journal. 49(4): p. 797-818, 2006.
68. Leland, H.E., Agency costs, risk management, and capital structure. Journal of Finance. 53(4): p. 1213-1243, 1998.
69. Levinthal, D.A., Adaptation on rugged landscapes. Management Science. 43: p. 934-950, 1997b.
70. Levinthal, D.A. and J.G. March, The myopia of learning. Strategic Management Journal. 14: p. 95-112, 1993.
71. Lewellen, K., Financing decisions when managers are risk averse. Working Paper, 2003.
72. Lewin, A.Y., C.P. Long, and T.N. Carroll, The coevolution of new organizational forms. Organization Science. 10(5): p. 535-550, 1999.
73. Manso, G., Motivating innovation. Working Paper, 2006.
74. March, J.G., Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization Science. 2: p. 71-87, 1991.
75. McConnell, J.J. and T.J. Nantell, Corporate combinations and common stock returns: the case of joint ventures. Journal of Finance. 40(2): p. 519-536, 1985.
76. Mehran, H., Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics. 38: p. 163-184, 1995.
77. Mitchell, W. and K. Singh, Survival of businesses using collaborative relationships to commercialize complex goods. Strategic Management Journal. 17(3): p. 169-196, 1996.
78. Mowery, D.C., International collaborative ventures in U.S. manufacturing. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA. 1988.
79. Mowery, D.C., J.E. Oxley, and B.S. Silverman, Strategic alliances and interfirm knowledge transfer. Strategic Management Journal. 17: p. 77-91, 1996.
80. Murphy, K.H., Executive compensation. Working Paper, 1998.
81. Murphy, K.J., Performance standards in incentive contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 30(3): p. 245-278, 2000.
82. Narayanan, V., et al., The influence of voluntarily disclosed qualitative information. Strategic Management Journal 21: p. 707-722, 2000.
83. Obleros, F.J. and R.J. MacDonald, Strategic alliances: Managing complementarity to capitalize on emerging technologies. Technovation. 7: p. 155-176, 1988.
84. Oliver, C., Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and future directions. Academy of Management Review. 15(2): p. 241-265, 1990.
85. Osborn, R.N. and C.C. Baughn, Forms of interorganizational governance for multinational alliances. Academy of Management Journal. 33: p. 503-519, 1990.
86. Pan, Y. and D.K. Tse, The hierarchical model of market entry modes. Journal of International Business Studies. 31(4): p. 535-554, 2000.
87. Park, S.H., R. Chen, and S. Gallagher, Firm resources as moderators of the relationship between market growth and strategic alliances in semiconductor start-ups. Academy of Management Journal. 45(3): p. 527-545, 2002.
88. Parrino, R., A. Poteshman, and M. Weisbach, Measuring investment distortions when risk-averse managers decide whether to undertake risky projects. Financial Management. 34: p. 21-60, 2005.
89. Paul, J.M., On the efficiency of stock-based compensation. Review of Financial Studies. 5: p. 471-502, 1992.
90. Peng, M.W., The resource-based view and international business. Journal of Management. 27: p. 803-829, 2001.
91. Pennings, J.M. and F. Harianto, Technological networking and innovation implementation. Organization Science. 3(3): p. 356-382, 1992.
92. Pisano, G.P., Using equity participation to support exchange:Evidence from the biotechnology industry. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 5(1): p. 109-126, 1989.
93. Pisano, G.P., M.V. Russo, and D. Teece, Joint ventures and collaborative agreements in the telecommunications equipment industry., in International collaborative ventures in U.S. manufacturing, D. Mowery, Editor. 1988: Cambridge. p. 23-70.
94. Porter, M.E., Competitive advantage, New York: Free Press. 1985.
95. Powell, W.W., K.W. Koput, and L. Smith-Doerr, Interorganizational collaboration and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science Quarterly. 41(1): p. 116-145, 1996.
96. Provan, K.G., Interorganizational linkages and influence over decision making. Academy of Management Journal. 25(2): p. 443-451, 1982.
97. Pukthuanthong, K., R. Roll, and T. Walker, How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance. Journal of Corporate Finance. 13: p. 695-720, 2007.
98. Rajgopal, S. and T. Shevlin, Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 33(2): p. 145-171, 2002.
99. Repenning, N.P. and J. Sterman, Capability traps and self-confirming attribution errors in the dynamics of process improvement. Administrative Science Quarterly. 47: p. 265-295, 2002.
100. Ross, S.A., Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness. Journal of Finance. 59(1): p. 207-225, 2004.
101. Rothaermel, F.T., Incumbent's advantage through exploiting complementary assets via interfirm cooperation. Strategic Management Journal. 22: p. 687-699, 2001.
102. Rothaermel, F.T. and D.L. Deeds, Exploration and exploitation alliances in biotechnology: A system of new product development. Strategic Management Journal. 25: p. 201-221, 2004.
103. Sanders, W.G., Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay. Academy of Management Journal. 44: p. 477-492, 2001.
104. Sanders, W.G. and D.C. Hambrick, Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risl taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal. 50(5): p. 1055-1078, 2007.
105. Shan, W., An empirical analysis of organizational strategies by entrepreneurial high-technology firms. Strategic Management Journal. 11(2): p. 129-139, 1990.
106. Shan, W., G. Walker, and B. Kogut, Interfirm cooperation and startup innovation in the biotechnology industry. Strategic Management Journal. 15: p. 387-394, 1994.
107. Smith, C.W. and R.M. Stulz, The determinants of firms hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 20(4): p. 391-405, 1985.
108. Smith, C.W. and R.L. Watts, The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and cmpensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics. 32(3): p. 263-292, 1992.
109. Sørenson, O. and T.E. Stuart, Syndication networks and the spatial distribution of venture capital investments. American Journal of Sociology. 106: p. 1546-1586, 2001.
110. Spekman, R.E., et al., Creating strategic alliances which endure. Long Range Planning. 29(3): p. 346-357, 1996.
111. Stuart, T.E., Interorganizational alliances and the performance of firms: A study of growth and innovation rates in a high-technology industry. Strategic Management Journal. 21: p. 791-811, 2000.
112. Teece, D.J., Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy. Research Policy. 15(6): p. 286-305, 1986.
113. Tufano, P., Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining industry. Journal of Finance. 51: p. 1097-1137, 1996.
114. Wright, P., et al., The structure of ownership and corporate acquisition strategies. Strategic Management Journal. 23: p. 41-55, 2002.
115. Yasuda, H., Formation of strategic alliances in high-technology industries: Comparative study of the resource-based theory and the transaction-cost theory. Technovation. 25: p. 763-770, 2005.
116. Yermack, D., Do corporations award CEO stock-options effectively? Journal of Financial Economics. 39(2-3): p. 237-269, 1995.
117. Yoshino, M. and U. Rangan, Strategic alliances: An entrepreneurial approach to globalization. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 1995.
校內:2107-08-20公開