隨著近年全球經濟復甦與車用電子持續發展，半導體需求穩步回升。針對日益攀升的產能需求，晶圓製造廠在評選半導體設備商時，已從過往著重交期與價格，逐漸轉向服務品質與供應鏈韌性等綜合評估。另一方面，地緣政治影響加劇促使本土供應商崛起，國際半導體設備廠商愈加仰賴當地代理商作為銷售與服務之合作夥伴。代理商熟悉當地市場、具備良好的顧客關係，成為原廠拓展市場的重要策略資源；而原廠基於服務即時性與當地營運成本考量，透過技術授權方式委由代理商提供售後維修服務，已成為常見合作模式。

本研究聚焦於半導體設備原廠與代理商所構成之供應鏈，探討原廠應如何最佳化授權比例、分潤抽成設計與產品定價策略，以兼顧雙方利潤與市場競爭力。研究中建構數學模型，區分為原廠直售與原廠+代理商銷售兩類銷售模式，並透過 納許議價模型分析雙方技術授權比例協商結果，並對關鍵變數進行數值分析。

研究結果發現：（1）代理銷售情境下，分潤比例越高將壓抑原廠最適定價，反映分潤壓力之作用；但當消費者對原廠品牌偏好低、服務敏感度高時，於低分潤區段反而可提升原廠定價，呈現反直覺現象；（2）在較高服務敏感度與較低品牌偏好市場，代理情境原廠利潤於適當分潤設計下可優於直售情境，與部分文獻中預設「直售通常較具利潤優勢」之結果相異；（3）授權比例協商結果受雙方議價能力顯著影響，若原廠議價權較高，最終技轉比例協商結果越趨近原廠偏好；（4）服務敏感度提升初期原廠須降價刺激市場，後期則轉由授權收益主導，利潤成長加速。

綜合而言，本研究結果突顯代理銷售策略設計之靈活性，透過適當分潤比例與授權策略搭配，原廠可兼顧收益與市場滲透力，並提升與代理商之合作穩定性。研究成果除補充現有供應鏈策略文獻，亦對高科技設備產業之實務管理提供具體參考建議。

In recent years, with the recovery of the global economy and the growth of automotive electronics, semiconductor demand has continued to rise. As capacity requirements increase, wafer fabrication plants are placing greater emphasis on service quality and supply chain resilience in selecting semiconductor equipment suppliers. At the same time, geopolitical factors have strengthened the role of local suppliers, prompting international manufacturers to rely more on local agents for sales and after-sales services. To enhance service responsiveness and reduce operational costs, it has become common for manufacturers to license after-sales service technologies to agents.

This study examines the supply chain between a semiconductor equipment manufacturer and its agent, focusing on optimizing the technology licensing ratio, revenue-sharing mechanism, and pricing strategies. A mathematical model is developed to compare two sales modes: direct sales and manufacturer-agent combined sales. Nash Bargaining analysis and numerical simulations are used to explore key decision variables.

The results show that: (1) Higher revenue-sharing ratios in agency sales suppress optimal pricing, but high service sensitivity and low brand preference can lead to higher prices in low revenue-sharing scenarios. (2) Under high service sensitivity, the manufacturer’s profit in the agency model may exceed that in direct sales, challenging conventional views. (3) The negotiated licensing ratio is influenced by bargaining power, with stronger manufacturer power yielding results closer to its preference. (4) As service sensitivity increases, profit growth shifts from price-driven to licensing-driven.

Overall, the study highlights the flexibility of agency sales strategies and offers insights for balancing profitability and market competitiveness in high-tech equipment industries.

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