本研究探討提名委員會設置及其治理品質，對台灣上市櫃非金融業公司高階主管薪酬與公司績效連動性（pay-performance sensitivity）的影響。根據代理理論，所有權與經營權分離下，高階主管薪酬與績效的連結被視為降低代理成本的重要機制（Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990）。然而，若前端董事遴選缺乏獨立性，後端薪酬契約容易流於形式。台灣自2020年推動「公司治理3.0－永續發展藍圖」以來，雖鼓勵設置提名委員會，但實務上設置比例仍偏低，且可能存在形式合規現象。本研究以2021年至2024年台灣上市櫃非金融業公司為樣本，最終有效觀測值共6,666筆，採用雙向固定效果模型，並區分「是否設置」（NomCom_dummy）與「治理品質綜合指標」（NC_Quality）進行檢定。實證結果顯示，單純設置提名委員會對公司會計績效（ROA）與市場價值（Tobin's Q）均無顯著直接影響，支持「形式重於實質」的假說。進一步檢視治理品質的調節效果後發現，高品質提名委員會在非電子產業中能顯著負向調節高階主管薪酬對ROA的敏感度，顯示其發揮監督功能；相對地，在電子產業中則未觀察到顯著調節效果。此結果支持本研究提出的產業異質性假說，亦即提名委員會的監督效能會因產業特性而有所差異。穩健性測試（含傾向分數配對與傳統以薪酬為因變數的PPS設定）大致支持主要結論。整體而言，本研究證實提名委員會的治理效果存在產業異質性，並為主管機關從「形式設立」轉向「實質品質提升」的政策方向提供在地實證證據。

Taiwan’s Corporate Governance 3.0 blueprint has promoted nomination committees as a mechanism for strengthening board oversight. This study examines whether the existence and governance quality of nomination committees affect the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance, using data from Taiwanese non-financial listed and OTC firms from 2021 to 2024 (6,666 firm-year observations).The results show that the mere existence of a nomination committee has no significant effect on firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Executive compensation is positively associated with both accounting performance and market value. Governance quality does not significantly moderate the pay-performance relationship in the full sample. However, in non-electronics firms, higher governance quality significantly weakens the sensitivity of compensation to accounting performance. No comparable moderating effect is observed in the electronics sector.These findings indicate that substantive committee quality matters more than formal establishment and that the monitoring role of nomination committees exhibits industry heterogeneity. The results support governance policies that emphasize committee composition, independence, and effective oversight rather than mere formal compliance.

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