群眾募資為近十年盛行的新型融資模式，資金不足的個人或團隊透過網路平台尋求群眾的贊助以實現其專案理念。而最受爭議的問題為「資訊不對稱」，募資者可憑藉著擁有產品品質資訊的優勢，誇大其產品品質與功能吸引缺少資訊的消費者贊助，導致消費者的逆向選擇，使真正高品質募資者退出市場，只剩下低品質募資者橫行，出現市場失靈情況，可見「資訊」在群眾募資中扮演了相當重要的角色。故本研究建立兩期的數學模型，運用傳訊賽局理論，探討在回饋型群眾募資中存在資訊不對稱下，分析是否存在分離均衡與混合均衡，募資者應如何決定其群眾募資策略，是否可透過第一期贊助價格來傳遞產品品質私有資訊。本研究參考質性研究中影響募資成功因素之實證結果，加入募資時間與兩期價格差量考量，更符合群眾募資產業中的實際特性。最後，本研究有三項重要發現與建議，第一，產品品質之生產效率會影響生產不同產品品質的兩類型募資者之總利潤，而募資者產品的品質與兩類型募資者的產品品質差距也會影響其群眾募資策略，當產品品質越高，建議募資者可設定較高的兩期價格與較長的募資時間獲取較多利潤，此外，當高品質產品相對於低品質產品之品質倍數差越高時，高品質募資者可設定較高的兩期價格與較長的募資時間。第二，存在資訊不對稱時，對高品質募資者較不利，對低品質募資者卻更有利，且低品質募資者有動機偽裝成高品質以獲取更多利潤，建議高品質募資者可視情況採取兩種分離均衡策略，透過第一期價格傳遞品質資訊，以解決資訊不對稱問題。第三，存在資訊不對稱時，消費者對於募資時間敏感度會影響高品質募資者的傳訊動機，當消費者對於募資時間敏感度越高，建議募資者必須設定較短的募資時間，而高品質募資者仍可以採取分離均衡策略以傳訊，使總利潤比不傳訊的總利潤好，在此情況下所需付出的傳訊成本也相對較少。

Crowdfunding is a new type of financing model that has prevailed in recent years. Individuals or entrepreneurs (called "creators", in Kickstarter), show their project ideas to the public through the internet. People, whom we refer to as "backers", who are interested in crowdfunding projects can pledge the creator’s project. However, the "information asymmetry" between creators and backers about product quality has caused many controversial issues. The study develops a two-period model and applies the game theory to reward-based crowdfunding under information asymmetry. In addition, the study adds the factor of the "crowdfunding time" and the "price difference between the two periods", which is more in line with the actual situation, and explores whether the first-period price is effective signals. It provides creators with some suggestions for making decisions such as setting prices and the crowdfunding time to solve the information asymmetry problem. Finally, this research shows three important results. (1) The production efficiency of product quality affects the total profits of creators. Furthermore, the product quality and the product quality gap between two types of creators affect creators’ strategies. We suggest that the higher the product quality is, the higher price and the longer crowdfunding time should be set. The higher the product quality gap between two types of creators, the higher price and the longer crowdfunding time should be set by the high-quality creator. (2) When there exists information asymmetry, the high-quality creator is disadvantaged compared to the low-quality creator, and the low-quality creator has the motive to pretend to be high-quality. We suggest that the high-quality creator should adopt two cases of separating strategies according to different situations. (3) When there exists information asymmetry, consumers' sensitivity to crowdfunding time will affect the high-quality creator’s signaling motivation and signaling cost. We suggest that the shorter crowdfunding period should be set and the high-quality creator can still adopt separating strategies to gain more profit than the profit without signaling. In this case, the high-quality creator’s signaling cost will be relatively small.

張嘉玲，2019。2019台灣群募趨勢觀測【FINDIT群眾募資亮點觀測站】。https://findit.org.tw/researchPageV2.aspx?pageId=1326
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