5G架構的推出，使得新型科技的應用場景得以實現，如AR/VR、智慧工廠…等，創新應用的實現更需要5G頻帶加以支援，這也使得稀缺的5G頻譜資源更顯彌足珍貴。但5G執照的第一波拍賣結果使頻譜價值備受質疑，因此衡量執照的頻譜價值顯得至關重要。
本研究著重於探討大型電信業者對執照使用權的出價動機，藉由模擬拍賣的方式模擬出類真實結果，將先回顧相關文獻，整理頻譜價值的衡量方式，再回顧國際間常用的拍賣形式與拍賣經驗，最後回顧台灣本身的頻譜拍賣經驗，以利於營收與成本模型及模擬拍賣程式的設定。
研究方法將藉由模擬拍賣的方式模擬出類真實結果探討電信業者對執照使用權的出價動機，以結果推論各業者的出價動機以衡量頻譜資源在各業者眼中所隱含的真實價值。政府未來也將開放第二波黃金頻段供各業者進行競標，本研究也將設定新頻段商業應用的營收與成本模型，模擬第二波釋照拍賣，利於後續業者拍賣做為參考。
比對第一波釋照模擬的結果與實際結果後發現，每MHz得標金額與實際結果相距不大，表示相關頻譜價值參數具參考價值；但實際得標的頻譜數量相差較大，推論因程式是以花光所有預算為優先，而可能保留預算用於其他資產投資上；而小型業者在未來推估現金流部分為負值，但頻譜執照仍有其資產價值，可能以貸款或籌資的方式爭取拍賣預算。
而在第二波釋照的預測後發現，因未來小型業者將被大型業者併購，因此三家大型業者的拍賣預算相近，導致最後市場規模均分的結果，並且第二波模擬的每MHz得標金額小於第一波釋照，符合過往台灣執照的拍賣經驗，模擬結果具正確性。
本研究給予後續相關研究以下建議，本研究採納的成本模型參數中，未考慮到更細節的層面，如相關土地與維護成本皆納入營運成本中，後續研究若能收集到以上資料將使模擬結果更精確；各業者基地台相關的使用廠商與技術也有變更的可能，使基地台相關成本有高估的可能，後續研究若能掌握細節資料也能使模擬結果更精確。

The 5G system can realize new technologies. The realization of innovative applications requires the support of 5G frequency bands. For this reason, the 5G spectrum resources are even more precious.
This study will start by reviewing the measurement method of spectrum value. The next step will review the auction forms and auction experiences commonly used on international. Finally, this study will review Taiwan’s spectrum auction experiences to facilitate the setting of revenue and cost models. With these models, the simulation can be started. The purpose of simulation is to explore the bidding motivations of telecom operators for license usage rights and use the results to infer the hidden real value of spectrum resources first wave 5G auction in Taiwan. The second wave 5G auction will be launched by government in the future. This study will also set up a revenue and cost model for commercial applications of the new frequency bands and simulate the outcome. The result of simulation can be used by future auctions.

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