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研究生: 李妍儒
Lee, Yen-Ju
論文名稱: 審計委員會偽治理與盈餘管理之關聯性
The Relations Between Audit Committees Distortion And Earning Management
指導教授: 黃華瑋
Huang, Hua-Wei
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年: 2023
畢業學年度: 111
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 37
中文關鍵詞: 審計委員會偽治理盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞: Audit Committees, Distortion, Earning Management
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  • 在公司治理相關的文獻中,已有多數學者探討審計委員會的獨立性、專業能力、
    薪酬等對公司治理的影響,但未見審計委員會偽治理對公司治理影響的相關研究,故
    本研究自獨董薪酬的角度辨識「偽治理」現象,並檢視審計委員會偽治理是否會降低
    盈餘品質。本研究以 2021 年台灣上櫃公司為研究對象,並透過裁決性應計數、小盈
    餘、達成或擊敗券商預測來衡量盈餘品質。實證結果顯示審計委員會偽治理與盈餘品
    質並無顯著關聯性。此外,本研究亦透過敏感性分析確保實證結果的穩健性,敏感性
    分析結果與主測試一致。整體而言,本研究雖未發現審計委員會偽治理與盈餘品質之
    間的關聯性,但增添了學術上對審計委員會偽治理的認知,為公司治理文獻做出貢獻。

    In the previous literature related to corporate governance, many scholars have explored the impact of audit committees' independence, professional competence, and compensation on corporate governance. However, there is a lack of research on the influence of distortion by audit committees on corporate governance.Therefore, this study aims to identify the phenomenon of distortion from the perspective of independent director compensation and examine whether distortion by audit committees reduces earnings quality. This study focuses on Taiwan's over-the-counter companies in 2021 and measures earnings quality through discretionary accruals, small earnings, and meeting or beating analyst forecasts. The empirical results indicate that no significant relationship between distortion by audit committees and earnings quality. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis was conducted to ensure the robustness of the empirical results, and the sensitivity analysis results were consistent with the main tests. Overall, although this study doesn't find a correlation between distortion by audit committees and earnings quality, it contributes to the academic understanding of distortion by audit committees and adds to the existing literature on corporate governance.

    摘要 i EXTENDED ABSTRACT ii SUMMARY ii INTRODUCTION iii MATERIALS AND METHODS iii RESULTS AND DISCUSSION iv CONCLUSION v 誌謝 vii 目錄 viii 表目錄 ix 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 4 第三章 研究設計 6 第一節 資料來源 6 第二節 樣本選取 6 第三節 實證模型 8 第四章 實證結果 13 第一節 敘述性統計 13 第二節 相關性分析 14 第三節 回歸結果 19 第四節 敏感性分析 27 第五章 結論與限制 32 第一節 研究結論 32 第二節 研究限制與建議 33 第七章 參考文獻 34

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