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研究生: 鄭翊伯
Cheng, Yi-Po
論文名稱: 傳統小吃業者進入新市場之加盟合約設計
A Franchising Contract Design for a Traditional Snack Firm When Entering a New Market
指導教授: 謝中奇
Hsieh, Chung-Chi
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 經營管理碩士學位學程(AMBA)
Advanced Master of Business Administration (AMBA)
論文出版年: 2019
畢業學年度: 107
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 41
中文關鍵詞: 連鎖加盟加盟關鍵成功因素加盟合約
外文關鍵詞: Franchise, franchising key successful factors, franchising contract
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  • 近年來,隨著外食人口的增加,以及社群網路資訊流通發達,導致餐飲需求增加,加上不同地區文化造成飲食的多樣性,各式各樣不同風格的餐飲業者數量眾多,以至於餐飲業者間的競爭相當激烈,連鎖化經營成為餐飲業近年來的發展趨勢,然而因台灣市場規模發展有限,已經有不少本地餐飲業者透過連鎖、品牌授權等模式轉往國際市場,台灣傳統小吃業者多是家族式傳統經營模式,往往缺乏組織化及系統式的專業經營,以致於營業規模大多處於微型或小型企業型態,若有好的管理及服務理念,經由連鎖化擴大市場,相信在國際市場上也能擁有足夠的發展潛力。
    雖然近年來許多企業藉由連鎖加盟體系在快速發展,但同時也出現許多問題,像是加盟總部與加盟者之間的資訊不對稱容易導致代理問題的產生,造成雙方利益上層出不窮的衝突與矛盾,而這些問題的根源往往在於不合理的合約費用設計上,當加盟者無法了解加盟業主實際營運狀況,或者加盟業主無法有效區分優良加盟者等狀況下,可能會影響雙方的獲利情形,本研究希望用數學模型建構市場環境,分析加盟業主及加盟者之最適決策和獲利。
    研究結果發現,對加盟業主而言,若想要提高自身總利潤,可以考慮建立加盟者成功關鍵指標並藉由某些事前調查方式事先了解加盟者自身能力,再根據加盟者自身能力設計個別之加盟金,接著在新市場的選擇上應該要考慮一投入資金彈性係數較高且當地加盟市場平均報酬率較低之市場,並且試著提高單位商品利潤及降低教育訓練成本之彈性係數。本研究亦發現加盟業主在設定投入營運資金最低要求時,能有一最適之投入營運資金最低要求可使得自身利潤最大化。

    In this study, we explored the franchise chain model for a Taiwanese snacks firm. We established a mathematical model by designing the initial fee and royalty fee of a franchise contract. Then, we derived the profit function and best strategy for the franchiser. In addition, we discussed whether the franchiser can get a higher profit when it knows the franchisee's ability in advance. Through numerical analysis, we found that the franchiser can limit the franchisees’ ability by setting a proper minimum investment fund, and increase the profit through designing the initial fee for each individual franchisee.

    目 錄 中文摘要 II 英文摘要 III 致謝 VI 目錄 VII 表目錄 IX 圖目錄 X 第一章 緒論 1 1.1 研究背景與動機 1 1.2 研究目的 2 1.3 研究內容與流程 2 第二章 文獻回顧 4 2.1 連鎖加盟之定義與分類 4 2.1.1連鎖加盟定義 4 2.1.2連鎖加盟體系之分類 7 2.2 加盟店評選成功關鍵指標 8 2.3 連鎖加盟合約 10 2.3.1連鎖加盟理論 10 2.3.2連鎖加盟合約設計 12 2.4 小結 13 第三章 模型建構與最佳化 14 3.1 情境說明與模型假設 14 3.2 符號定義 16 3.3 利潤函式 17 3.3.1加盟者之利潤函式 17 3.3.2加盟業主之利潤函式 18 3.4 情境一之最佳化決策 19 3.5 情境二之最佳化決策 23 3.6 小結 24 第四章 數值分析 25 4.1 參數設定 25 4.1.1參數變動範圍設定 26 4.2 單位商品利潤m之分析 26 4.3 加盟者投入資金彈性係數a之分析 28 4.4 加盟業主設定最低營運資金c之分析 29 4.5 加盟市場平均報酬率r之分析 31 4.6 教育訓練成本彈性係數α之分析 32 4.7 小結 34 第五章 結論與未來研究方向 36 5.1 結論 36 5.2 未來研究方向 37 參考文獻 38

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